In Search of New Social Democracy: Insights from the South - Implications for the North - Transscript

Transcript: “In Search of New Social Democracy: Insights from the South - Implications for the North”, a conversation with Olle Törnquist.

Opener  (00.00:02) 

This is the Nordic Asia podcast.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.00:09) 

Welcome to the Nordic Asia podcast, a collaboration sharing expertise on Asia across the Nordic Region. My name is Kenneth Bo Nielsen. I'm a social anthropologist based in Oslo and the coordinator of the Norwegian Network for Asian Studies. I'm here today with Olle Törnquist, professor emeritus of Political Science and Development Research at the University of Oslo. Professor Törnquist is a leading scholar of democratization in the Global South, and has also worked extensively on social democratic development in a comparative perspective. He joins us today to discuss his recent book titled “In search of new social democracy: insights from the south, implications for the North”. The book was published by Bloomsbury earlier this fall. Welcome, Olle, and thank you so much for joining us.

Olle Törnquist  (00.01:02) 

Thank you for having me.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.01:05) 

Olle, when we sat down to talk about your book recently, you called this your end book. Why is that?

Olle Törnquist  (00.01:13) 

Well, it's simple. When one reaches the ultimate retirement age in Scandinavia, in Norway its’s 70, one can’t hold on to a tenured position, such as Professor. That’s fair enough, but it also means that it’s very difficult to get further public funding for the kind of fieldwork that my research has depended on during all these years. And private funding is unlikely. So even if I could have done further research, I must conclude the extensive in-depth work now and limit myself to small follow-up tasks. Hence, I thought I should summarise in an endbook, for all who contributed their insights, and for those who wish to benefit from them when moving on.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.01:57) 

So the aim of ‘In Search of New Social Democracy’ is to answer the question why the classical social democratic vision about development based on social justice by democratic means has lost ground – in-spite of the negative effects of global neoliberalism and the fading of the once so promising third wave of democracy. And if there are any openings. You do this by defining Social Democracy inclusively in historical perspective. And then you use it as a basis for interrogating findings from fifty years of research on democracy and social rights movements in Indonesia, India and the Philippines, with Sweden and to some extent South Africa and Brazil as reference cases. This is quite an exercise – but what, then, is novel and special about your answer to the question of the decline of social democracy?

Olle Törnquist  (00.03:00) 

Well, that's a challenging point of departure. There is indeed rather broad agreement among leftist and critical analysts, for example, in Scandinavia, that mainstream social democrats have lost their way by adjusting to market driven development. Hence, they argue that there must be a new focus on national so called new deals, along with welfare reforms to regain the initiative, especially from neoconservative chauvinist. But actually my results suggest that these critics are partially wrong by forgetting about internationalism and turning inward focusing on national programs only. I think Thomas Piketty is right: One can't build social democracy in one country, especially not since the 1970s.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.03:48) 

Why since the 1970s, in particular?

Olle Törnquist  (00.03:52)  

Well, that is when the international monetary regulations were scrapped and when the efforts by social democrats like Willy Brandt and Olof Palme to build a so called New International Economic Order through partnership between North and South was refuted by international finance and forces of neo-liberalism, soon including leaders like Margret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Moreover, we must remember, that their reaction was possible much because the progressives in South were not strong enough to put up a fight along with Brandt and Palme for a New Economic Order. And the reason for that, in turn, my book suggests, was that the activists in the South had deprioritised democratisation during the cold war and therefore failed to counter the capturing of the post-colonial states by rightist forces. Some progressives were literally eliminated, like Allende in Chile 1973.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.04:50) 

But didn’t it help that there was also a so-called third wave of democracy and that the cold war came to an end?

Olle Törnquist  (00.04:59) 

Yes, yes, you right. These processes meant that there was a chance to alter the setbacks. Particularly in the south, mainstream Social Democrats tried alliances with liberals and the more radical friends tried to foster change from below through unions, civil society groups and social movements. So the main question in the book is why it was so difficult anyway, to renew social democracy during the third wave, including in the cases that you have already mentioned? And based on these insights, I also ask if there are any new openings in the south, and thus in the north too.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.05:37) 

Yet, isn't it so that many analysts, including those positioned on the left argue that social democracy is simply not feasible in the South, because the uneven and often extractive development along with many informal laborers and weak unions, differs so fundamentally from the industrial revolution that enabled the rise of the social democratic labor movement as we know it in the North?

Olle Törnquist  (00.06:01) 

Yes, but also no, they are certainly right about the challenges, but I think they are wrong about the opportunities. In short, I think they are as wrong as the modernization school theorists who assumed that social, economic and political development in the south must come about exactly as in the North. If we analyze instead, as I've tried to do, the contextual political economy and movements and struggle in the south, it's clear that there are not just problems to build social democracy, but also new options.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.06:35) 

So in other words, are you saying that the weakening of the progressives in the 50s, 60s, and also 70s, after independence - in other words, the crumbling of the second anti colonial wave of democracy and the rise of authoritarian capitalism - which also made it impossible to contain the rise of global neoliberalism and build a new international economic order in the 1970s, are you saying that these obstacles were not inevitable, but could somehow have been avoided?

Olle Törnquist  (00.07:06) 

Yes, that is really my first major conclusion. And I think it's particularly enlightening to compare Indonesia and the Indian state of Kerala in this respect. You know, in Kerala since the late 1920s, and Indonesia during the main parts of the 1950s, it was possible for widely defined social democratic movements to build broad unity for equal civil and democratic political rights, and, on the basis of this, to also struggle for social rights – by democratic means, over the years including electoral victories. However, these priorities changed in the late 1950’s when left-nationalist’s and communists’ supported the so-called Guided Democracy, which was imposed by President Sukarno and the central army leaders to strengthen the nation-state. They retained direct modern relations between state and citizens but substituted populism and military governance for mediation by citizen’s own organisations and through multi-party elections. Worst, when the military leaders found that they did not have a sufficiently strong state apparatus and popular organisation of their own to fight the leftists – in contrast to the Nazis in Europe -- the generals gave up on the principle of direct state-citizen relations and reinvented instead the colonial combination of central despotism and indirect rule, mostly via religious anti-communist communities and militias. This is how they enforced a colonial-like genocide of in-between 500.000 and 1 million people. When thus the Left had been extinguished, Suharto returned to direct authoritarian rule, but now with struct prohibition of independent popular organisation.

For progressives, this was a dual failure. Firstly, the left-nationalist’s and communists’ support for ‘Guided Democracy’ had meant that they could no longer build broad alliances based on equal civil and democratic rights to fight for comprehensive social reforms (such as land reforms), contain ‘state capture’ by the ruling groups (including so-called bureaucratic capitalists), and resist the military’s use of central despotism and indirect rule and repression through religious and ethnic communities and militias. Secondly, meanwhile, many western-oriented social democrats and liberals had subscribed to what the American political scientist Samuel Huntington later labelled ‘politics of order’. The argument was that modernisation and weak middle classes were not enough to later build democracy -- there must also be a strong state. And if nobody else could build that strong state, the military had to intervene. So initially these western-oriented social democrats and liberals even supported the military and general Suharto. Just as in Vietnam and later in the many ‘middle-class coups’ in Africa and Latin America. And much later on in for example Afghanistan. Both these strategies were as devastating as the Maoist attempts at armed peasants’ struggle. But, and this is the conclusion: these destructive strategies were not inevitable! There was a major exception: the leftists in Kerala. Socialists and communists held on to the same priorities as the Indonesian progressives had adhered to before ‘Guided Democracy’, to frame class and other demands for social rights under the unifying umbrella of quests for equal civil and democratic political rights. This has remained fundamental for the Kerala achievements, until today. And it does remain a crucial lesson for everyone, especially today when right wing identity politics as well as authoritarian state-building are once again on the agenda.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.11:13) 

But didn't progressives regain the initiative later on with the third wave of democracy, including the pink tide in Latin America, the victory of the ANC and Nelson Mandela in South Africa? And in Asia, with the Democratic ‘people-power-revolutions’ against Marcos’ dictatorship in the Philippines in 86. Later on the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, and the flourishing also of the center left in India in the early years of the 2000s?

Olle Törnquist  (00.11:43) 

Yes, these were great advances, and we do need to acknowledge them. But we must also ask why they were not sustainable and transformative. And if there are new options, this is the main task in the book. And there are five major conclusions. Firstly, the wave of democracy was never backed up by social democratic economic and social policies, and international support for that, as after the Second World War in North Europe, which really made the difference there, as Sheri Bermanhas shown so brilliantly in her book about democracy and dictatorship in Europe. So there was never a broad labor movement like in Europe. The result in the South was some industrial growth but also plunder, increasing inequalities, poor work conditions, lots of people without job, lack of class based organization, and community and constant difficulties to unify people with precarious work conditions. This generates discordant interest and priorities among ordinary people and weak progressive organizations.There is no doubt that there is a dearth of broad class-based collectivities. Temporarily employed workers and informal sector laborers tend to be neglected, as painfully confirmed, even in the case of South Africa, where the ANC has tried to follow liberal social, democratic and also Scandinavian union prescriptions. Efforts at decent jobs, and universal minimum wages, as suggested by the ILO are fine, but there must also be policies to compensate for the lack of similar conditions as those in Scandinavia during the peak of social democracy, including rather low rate of unemployment. In short, broad interest based collectivities can hardly be built only and mainly at the level of production, but also common interest in comprehensive civil political and social rights reform to rally behind. The second point is that democratization has remained elite dominated and is fraying. Again, much because of the lack of inclusive social democratic development, as in North Europe after the second world war. Thus the old elites have also not done much to foster impartial governance. Even the left in West Bengal turned authoritarians and lost out. And something similar happened to the ANC in South Africa, which is losing ground. And the Philippines and Indonesia, which was celebrated as major examples of liberal democratization have both backslided because the powerful elites have retained power, and the new institutions have prevented pro-democrats from advancing and improving on democratization. Remarkably, it has to be admitted, moreover, that this has not been prevented, but instead actually supported by mainstream international pro democracy aid, which hadn't focused on cooperation among the leads, or new rules of the game. And while military intervention as in Afghanistan made things even worse, popular protests as during the Arab Spring were short of organisation and protection. To make things worse, efforts to counter this with popular participation in local governance have been difficult to scale up, even in the most successful case of Kerala, and to relate to other levels and actors. Hence, the chances remain slim for progressives to gain representation, to fight against corruption, and to even oversee implementation of the internationally celebrated Agenda 2030. Thirdly, equally disconcerting it has been next to impossible in Indonesia, India and the Philippines to make a difference in national governance by combining and scaling up scattered interests, innovative unions and civil society groups, and local practices. Bottom-up is simply not enough. This resonates with challenges for the more acclaimed ANC in South Africa and Workers party in Brazil too. Least we forget, for example, that the acclaimed participatory budgeting in Brazil did not help to fight the corruption and abuse of power on the national level, especially in Brasilia, the capital.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.16:14) 

So these are the challenges or the problems and they are, as you lay them out here, quite significant. But you said that they were also promising openings?

Olle Törnquist  (00.16:23)  

Yes, the fourth conclusion is that, in-spite of the problems of uniting people on the level of production as well by bringing various popular and civil society groups together, it has proved possible to build broad alliances of progressive politicians, unions, other popular groups, and civil society activists, including parts of media, in favour of comprehensive civil rights and transformative welfare and development reforms. For example, for acceptable urban development that consider the rural poor, equal rights to welfare, more jobs and better employment relations, plus non-corrupt provisioning. And democratic citizens’ participation for this is not just about fighting for the reforms but also implementing and overseeing them.

The best examples include the successful alliance a decade ago for Indonesia’s public health reform and the Left Front’s recent landslide victories in Kerala’s elections on the basis of universal health and welfare measures in the struggle against Covid-19, along with efforts at knowledge based sustainable development.  If such comprehensive reforms are combined with democratic participation by the parties concerned, it is also possible to contain populism – such as Kerala has managed to do against India’s chauvinist religious identity politics– as well as to fight corruption and strengthen democracy. Equally important, broad alliances for rights and welfare may on top of it all generate strong enough collectivities to negotiate the kind of social growth pacts that are crucial for Social Democracy, but which have been unfeasible so far, except in authoritarian East Asian tigers, because of the shortage of similarly forceful and comprehensive labour and employers’ organisations as in northern Europe.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.18:23) 

That sounds promising, but in that case, why have we not seen more successful examples of this in practice?

Olle Törnquist  (00.18:31) 

Well, The fifth conclusion is that the common major reason may be summarised in terms of two political obstacles. One obstacle is the shortage of not just one comprehensive reform but whole series of them, to continue to unite behind and make transformative by being designed to gradually strengthen popular capacity. Social Democracy is not to smash capitalism by way of a revolution or to dogmatically fight against markets, but instead about democratic struggle for transformative regulations and reforms that step by step can nourish Democratic Socialism in terms of as much social equity, equality and welfare as possible as a foundation for sustainable development. The other obstacle is poor democratic representation when the alliances negotiate with employers and the governments. Direct negotiations between populist leaders and civil society and interest organisations are often promising but not institutionalised and made democratic. Rather they tend to turn transactional, and to make leaders like Indonesia’s Jokowi too powerful. Which is fertile ground for ‘strong’ right-wing populist leaders.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.19:54)  

So, if we turn to the sub-title of your book, what are the implications for us who happened to be living in the North?

Olle Törnquist  (00.20:04) 

Well, in a way, the answer is very simple. Our international work – to support inclusive and sustainable development, as well as human rights, and democracy, and workers organisation, and struggle against corruption --should be redirected to foster the fundamental preconditions for this by giving top priority to the support for, and cooperation with, the kind of promising broad alliances (between progressive politicians, unions, other popular groups and civil society) that I have identified, for equal civic rights and democratic welfare. Plus to help fighting the obstacles by supporting design and anchoring of (i) series of transformative reforms and formats for democratic partnership governance.

In fact, we even have some historical experiences of our own of this in Scandinavia from the ‘old’ welfare and equality reforms and from the participation of interest organisations in design and implementation – some of which have now faded away. That may be a source of inspiration, if embedded in the other contexts, of course. Which calls for more contextual studies – rather than the universal quantification of simplistic variables that is gaining ground in our universities.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen  (00.21:34) 

Olle Törnquist, thank you so much for joining us today. And once again, congratulations on the publication of your book “In search of new social democracy: insights from the south implications for the North”, published by Zed-Bloomsbury this fall. My name is Kenneth Bo Nielsen and thank you for joining the Nordic Asia Podcast showcasing Nordic collaboration in studying Asia.

Closer  (00.22:03)  

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