Masks of Authoritarianism - Transcript

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:00:02]

This is the Nordic Asia podcast. Welcome to the Nordic Asia Podcast, a collaboration sharing expertise on Asia across the Nordic region. My name is Kenneth Bo Nielsen. I'm a social anthropologist based in Oslo and also one of the leaders of the Norwegian Network for Asian Studies. In this episode, we introduce you to a new edited volume on Bangladesh. It's titled Mask of Authoritarianism, Hegemony, Power and Public Life in Bangladesh. It was published by Springer this year and is edited by RL England and Mubi Shahid Hasan. These two editors are, in fact also former colleagues of mine in Oslo. And they join us today to talk us through this book. I'm happy to welcome both Arild Engelsen Ruud, professor of South Asia studies in Oslo. And also Mubashar Hasan, adjunct fellow at the Humanitarian and Development Research Initiative, Western Sydney University in Australia. Welcome to the both of you. Also with us are two contributors to this book, Maha Mirza and Asheque Haque. Asheque Haque is a researcher of security and politics in the South Asia region and he currently works with security and human rights issues in a civil society organisation. Maha Mirza is a writer, researcher and human rights activist based in Dhaka. She writes regularly on issues of development and labor rights, but also environmental justice. And Maha and Asheque will offer glimpses into their respective chapters. And welcome to the two of you as well. Now, as we know, Bangladesh recently celebrated its 50th anniversary as an independent nation. Much has been achieved in this half century, including the country moving in the right direction on the Human Development Index for some time now, performing better. In fact, on many indicators than many of its South Asian neighbours. But this is also counterbalanced by the development that you analyze in your book, namely the increasing authoritarianism that characterizes governance in Bangladesh. And in fact, in the newly published Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia that we have discussed in previous episodes of the Nordic Asia Podcast. And that book is actually unambiguous on this point. Not only does it describe Bangladesh as typical of the so-called third wave of autocrats ization, it also stresses that the integrity and fairness of democratic elections have been undermined in spectacular fashion since 2014. Arild Engelsen Ruud, as one of the editors of this book. Tell us about how the book engages with this question of authoritarianism. I mean, in particular, I suspect that listeners may be interested in the mechanisms behind this increasing authoritarian turn in Bangladesh.

Arild Engelsen Ruud

Right. Thank you, Kenneth, for that question. I think there's two central reasons for why increasing authoritarianism in Bangladesh is happening at the pace that it is. Because you mentioned the 2014 election, and that's been an increasing or undermining of democratic practice in the country since 2014. The interesting thing with 2014 election is that it was it happened because the opposition boycotted the election. They did not expect it to be fair and it wasn't fair. But it didn't help that they boycotted it. And I think it was a tactical error. Plus, again, there's another election 2018, which sort of confirms the suspicion that elections in the country would not be fair. In essence, what you have seen now is over the last ten years or so is just abolishment of what in practice is a one party state. The two things here that I think are important to note for this development in in authoritarianism in the country, and one is that this one party state is an edifice of central state arms. It's a collaboration of central state arms, in particular what it's been known as the ABC state. So A four Army league B for barracks or the Army and C for civil service. But it also it includes very much the police or law enforcers and the judiciary. And these are these are state arms that collaborate quite closely. There is still the same law, the same rule of law is exists as a formula, but it's applied in a biased way and it's applied in a way that supports mutually officials from this different state. So army officers are supported by the judiciary, comply, and judges are given land to build houses and a lot of money, etc.. So there's a there's a strong collaboration internally among these states. A second development is in laws. The laws have not been changed all that much in the country. But there is one which is particularly interesting. You don't really have censorship in Bangladesh. You don't have state censorship except for, you know, in certain cases. But that's smaller cases like films and sex films, etc.. I'm. But there is a law that's very central in the establishment of authoritarian state among leaders, and that's called the Digital Security Act. It builds on the previous act from 2013, I think, or it's older, right, that there's a section there and then it's coming out now again in a new shape in the Telecommunications Act. This act allows for people who are offensive, electronically to be jailed. And it's it's a largely non-bailable offence. So you'd be put in jail and the case may be dismissed by some judge later on. But you still suffer in jail for a long while or the case just lingers on. The problem here is that it allows for petty quarrels to land you in jail. So what authors and collaborators do this volume have called? Attention seekers and sycophants sycophants as well as other journalists. Your rivals may bring a case against you that will be a big inconvenience for you and may even land you in jail. This is interesting because it suggests and this is the core of the book, how does everyone become or a large section of the population become members of this authoritarian set up? And thus, by allowing these laws to be used by individuals in petty quarrels. So it's not so much censorship as it is self-censorship that allows this edifice to continue its existence.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:07:40]

Maha Mirza, if we move from these sort of larger concerns with state institutions and state law, if we try to ground this sort of larger process of authoritarianism. Maha, in your chapter, you've investigated the process through which a so-called megaprojects are constructed in Bangladesh, and by megaprojects, I should clarify that we mean these. Surprisingly many and surprisingly large projects like coal power plants, seaports, express highways, and so on. And as I read you, you you argue actually quite convincingly that the states push for economic growth through these mega-projects actually reinforce the authoritarian characteristics of the regime. But I also take you to suggest that there's actually something inherently undemocratic about mega-projects, which is a claim that's actually in the title of your chapter, albeit with a question mark. Mega-projects inherently undemocratic. Could you explain to us why you think these mega-projects are repressive in nature?

Maha Mirza

Yeah. Thank you for inviting me here. First of all, the megaprojects you're talking about, most of these mega projects in Bangladesh are energy generating projects like planned projects or infrastructure related to energy transportation. So, you know, these projects have been promoted as to be highly useful for the development of an energy starving country like Bangladesh. However, as I argued in the chapter, that, you know, the entire process of building a mega-project goes through layers and layers of corruption and irregularities and repressive actions, which actually begins with the very process of the land acquisition itself. And, you know, big infrastructure projects are nothing new in Bangladesh. But what is new in the last one decade is that the number of mega projects have increased quite extensively and the extent of repression carried out by the government in these projects size such just simply overwhelming. For example, in the case of Rampal power plant, we have seen two rural villages have just been wiped out from the map of Iran, which is a coastal district in Bangladesh. In the case of other coastal power plants, the entire farming communities of these areas are just being wiped out. And you can see that there is a routine justification from the government that these farmers are being well compensated and they receive huge amount of money in exchange of their land and property habitation. Towns are being built for these displaced communities and blah blah. And if you really visit these communities, you will see a very, very different picture. You will see that the local families are forced to leave. The amount of money they receive is not sufficient enough for the land and resources they have lost, and they are forced to pay large amounts of bribes to even receive the compensation money itself. And what is very alarming is that the amount of lies and misinformation we we get from the field, for example, is being claimed that each land acquisition process follows some forms of public consultation meetings, and the entire process of acquisition is done with the participation of local communities. And thereby the process is very democratic and accountable. But this is a blatant lie because, yes, there are occasional consultations during the land acquisition process, but it is only the local ruling party members who get to participate in these meetings. And most of the times, you know, the local people don't even know about this consultation programs. And even if they know their opinions are hardly taken seriously and sometimes they're even being seriously threatened or abused for being vocal. So as I have argued in the chapter, that this whole process of public consultation is actually being carried out in the first place to create an illusion of democratic engagement, which actually doesn't have any kind of accountability to the local communities whatsoever. Rather, any kind of local struggles are being dealt with extreme level of harsh actions. For instance, in Berkeley, which is a coastal district in Bangladesh, for local protesters who are being killed with a clash with the police in 2016. In Bida Coal Power Project area, we have seen hundreds of false cases are being filed against The local workers were just protesting. And we have seen enormous number of false court cases, threats or even physical abuses. Only a few were found to be taking part in any kind of demonstrations. So, you know, it is definitely fair to say that every single mega-project sites in Bangladesh currently have become subject of severe authoritarian oppression and subject of serious human rights violation. And the process of building mega-projects are becoming more and more and more repressive in nature nowadays.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:12:38]

You mentioned these local struggles now that are also an important part of the picture, because, of course, when whenever there's power, this also resistance. And you do write about these instances of resistance to megaprojects in your chapter as well. And I be curious to know just a little more about how these local struggles play out and to what extent they may sometimes be successful. Maybe to pose this question a little differently, since the book has hegemony in its subtitle, do you see these localized struggles as somehow having the potential to become a kind of counter demonic force?

Maha Mirza

Yes. You know, as we know, one of the most of this occurred lands or a predominantly fertile agricultural land in the project side. So it's only expected that local farming communities are not going to be just giving up their land, which is the only source of their livelihood. And it's quite obvious that local people would protest and try to stop this kind of project. But, you know, it's important to note that different areas experience different kinds of resistance, and not every local struggle produces the same kind of results or not every local struggle becomes successful. For example, if you look at the case of Full body, which is located in the northern part of Bangladesh, we observed a massive movement against an open pit coal mining project there in the year of 2006, and that was a successful movement because the community in full body was able to stop the mining project back then, despite significant amount of state violence and four people died. However, in the recent years, unfortunately things have changed. What we see nowadays is despite local struggles, the construction of almost all of these mega-projects are still going on. So I think it's not a very happy picture out there. So I think it would be interesting to ask why. Nowadays local struggles are more and more difficult to carry out. And I have noted some observation regarding this. First of all, it seems like the government has learned from its previous mistakes and it is now better equipped to deal with the local people. For example, nowadays the company and the government together spend a lot of money in the initial phase of the project. For example, in the case of basically we have seen there is a lot of effort in bribing the local community leaders. We have seen that an enormous amount of money is spent to buy the loyalty of the local reporter. So the incidents of forceful displacements are never reported at all. And the most important strategy of the government nowadays is to create fear in the area. From the very beginning of the project plan using all kinds of surveillance tactics. So basically they're very well prepared and well equipped to deal with any kind of local demonstrations from the very beginning of the project, which was not the same in the earlier cases of mega development projects. Another thing is that a very complex geopolitical scenario has evolved around Bangladesh in the last decades. The extent of Chinese investment has expanded throughout the country. You have heavy Japanese investment in the coastal belts. You have Russian investment in the nuclear power project, and of course you have Indian investment in the Rampal Gold project. So there is a complex international financial network around these projects and a very powerful network of vested interest groups are the direct beneficiaries of this project. So, you know, it is interesting that it is not only the Bangladesh government, but also other powerful, influential stakeholders are proactively pushing for these projects, and that really demands more and more repressive measures from the host government in case of any chaos in the field. So overall, you can see that the local struggles are dealt with more and more authoritarian measures. However, having said that, you still have different forms of local struggle in each of these areas. So it really depends on the forms of unity and the political maturity of the local communities to be able to become an effective counter hegemonic force that you are referring to. And of course there are past experiences of successful local struggles and social movements which show that it is not impossible.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:16:50]

Asheque Haque, if we if we turn to your chapter, it's on Queer Life in Bangladesh, but it's also, to a large extent, a chapter on intrusive state surveillance into the sphere of intimacy, one might say. It's based on three interviews, something which is an anthropologist really appreciated. I mean, this way of looking for answers to big questions in very small samples. The main takeaway from your chapter, as I read it, is how these three interlocutors of yours all experience forms of societal censure, but that they do so really and in quite different ways.

Asheque Haque [00:17:30]

Exactly. Thank you very much, Kenneth, for the question. I must say that it was indeed a very interesting research project, but also one with the very high security risks. The issues that I discuss in the chapter is a really very taboo subject. And in fact, people have been killed in the past for raising them as well. So, I mean, that's why perhaps it's no surprise that these things are talked about in hushed tones and in muted conversations away from the public space, which really there isn't any or this community. It's also interesting, as it would say, that the center affects not only those who are living there and being around it, but also those who are writing and researching about them as well. But to go back to your question, I think I write about the three queer individuals and their perception of security and insecurity in all of this. They come from different socioeconomic backgrounds, and that really sets apart their experiences and reflections of security. So in that sense, socioeconomic class plays an important role in this regard. But there's also another aspect, and that is the different social capital that these individuals have, the social connections, networks and so on that allows us to be who we are. They play a very important role in the perception of security. One of the interlocutors that they come from a wealthy family and enjoys the protection from the society. By living in that bubble, but within their own family, though, it's not a free space and self-censor continues even there. The other two are more in the public eye due to their activism or content creation. But both of them are fully aware how they should act, speak and express opinions in such places. This is primarily due to their fears of insecurity, but also from a clear understanding that there's really no place for them to turn to in order to find security because of who they are.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:19:23]

To return to this spectre of authoritarianism in your chapter? I think this is particularly visible in how, as you picked up on just now, one of your interlocutors points out there is no redress for complaints, no meaningful political process, no public debate to turn to. So in addition to shedding light on this very intimate experiential dimensions of authoritarianism, your chapter of innocence is also a tale precisely of this kind of differentiated vulnerability. Could you tell us a little bit more about this, please?

Asheque Haque [00:20:00]

I think going through this research, it was evident that the queer community finds themselves in a very precarious place that is often beyond the public institutions and mainstream mechanisms, especially when their identity is exposed, and thus their sense of understanding and their vulnerability is quite different and probably multiplied. One could say also what is very important is the queer lives are criminalized in Bangladesh by a colonial era law, and just the very presence of it impedes a secure and dignified life for the community members. And the question has been asked, Well, is there a process of change? How do people bring about change in a peaceful manner in a situation like that? And the answer was quite difficult to find. One of the interlocutors, an activist, was most aware of the closed groups, and he was saying that in this situation there is no meaningful political process that exists. It's not possible to really engage with elected officials because that cyclical nature of political change and the ideas of accountability of elected officials to their citizens, all that is absent. It's also not something that really can bring results in their minds and they don't find the process to safely engage in such mechanisms as well.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:21:23]

Just a last particular question to your chapter, because earlier Arild too mentioned this digital Security Act from 2018. Some listeners may be familiar with it, some may be less familiar with it. But I noticed that in your chapter in particular, this act pops up quite a lot. Why does this act, which has been described as draconian? Why does it become particularly relevant or pressing in the context of these queer lives that you write about?

Asheque Haque [00:21:53]

Exactly. Digital Security Act came about in October of 2018, I believe, and it was a law that controlled engagements and expressions in the digital sphere for Bangladeshis all over. And there has been a lot of criticism about it since then as it came about. There are some reports as well, for example, between October 2018 and November 2020. So in about two years time, there have been more than 1000 cases filed under this act against ordinary citizens, activists, academics, journalists for criticising government policies or political leadership, etc.. And one has to understand these people are still more mainstream than someone in a queer community. They would be even a pariah out of this. And the issue for them, why the digital space is so important. They don't have the possibility to engage in a physical space in the country, in the public sphere of the digital space, once the safe space for them, where provided the safety of anonymity and thus a security for them in order to engage and find some meanings and engagements and social fabric. One could say, But now that can be criminalized quite easily. Also, as I wrote in the book, organizing online movements or events on such topics in a digital space can be criminalized within this act as well. So it becomes very difficult for queer community members to find security. Furthermore, what this does is that one nowadays also need some sort of ID to access the Internet and access some of these spaces so it's no longer possible to really hide away from the consequences and engagements, opinions, even mundane things that one could put on social media could really lead to a judicial process or even extrajudicial ones, sometimes including mob violence that really affects human lives. So that is why particularly this digital space controlling mechanisms are really they affect the queer community.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:24:03]

It's a fascinating chapter that gives us insights into a sphere of social life in Bangladesh that we actually seldom hear very much about. Co-Editor Mubashar Hasan. I think the same can be said for your chapter. You write about Bangladeshi rap musicians. You do so with with a colleague of yours. My hunch is that quite a few listeners might be quite surprised to learn that there is in fact an extremely lively rap music scene in Bangladesh. Tell us more about this and maybe especially why you think rap music makes for such a good entry point into questions of authoritarianism in Bangladesh.

Mubashar Hasan [00:24:44]

Rap music is an excellent form of intuition to study authoritarian governments and authoritarian cultures. Rap music emerged as a protest music in the United States, a democratic country. American rap musicians are pivotal in advancing criticism of authoritarian culture towards black communities in the US. For example, black American rappers and rap groups like Tupac Shakur, NWA and Public Enemy raised their voices against police brutality and violence taking place in the black communities in the American suburbs. In recent times, following the brutal police killing of an African-American man, George Floyd in Minneapolis, rapper Kendrick Lamar's song All Right, which underscores police brutality towards the black community and Childish Gambino, This is America, A song narrating and depicting white nationalism and race infused crime in America have become signature songs of Black Lives Matter movement. This underscores the power of rap music, not only in America. Researchers have found in Italy that musicians rejected the political right during the Arab Spring. Russian rapper and general strike raised Lip Lad in which he says, Mr. President, people have become like animals. We are living like dogs. Became an instant viral hit and in recent times. Against the backdrop of rising authoritarian culture, India has seen a proliferation of rap bands and rap singers who have used rap music to address social and political issues like caste, poverty, unemployment is dead, violence and so forth. In summary, I should note that rap music's raw and political lyrics and locally contextualized rhythms can connect with audiences in a deeply personal way and act as a potent social critique, especially where the divisions between the powerful and the powerless are most pronounced.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:26:46]

I note that in your chapter, I think your interlocutors broadly fall into one of two categories. There are some who are turning away from rap music, while the other category proves to be more resilient and persevere. This, I suppose, will, tells us something quite interesting about Bangladesh today.

Mubashar Hasan [00:27:08]

Yeah. This trend of being fearful is hardly surprising. They have good reason to fear. For example, during the COVID 19 pandemic, at least a dozen people, including a female professor, a civil society activist and a cartoonist, were sent to jail for criticizing the government's handling of the coronavirus pandemic and anti-free speech law. The Called Digital Security Act was used to muzzle them. Within this highly charged context, where the state is more powerful than ever, several leading rappers reveal to us that personal safety is now their primary focus. For example, a rapper Slate was afraid of releasing some of my songs because of incidents such as forceful disappearances of the critics and opponents of taking place. So I'm genuinely afraid, he said. His mother told him tough times. There were less tough people, so this is the time of survival. However, there are some younger rappers who are seemingly less concerned. A rapper called Did List released this song, passed the police in mid 2018 during the time of road safety movement when police and the ruling party reportedly attacked protesters who were demanding safer roads. The song was loaded with political arguments, protests and criticism in small and angry language. Similarly, a rapper called Nizam Rob Bee in his song called Rushed Address The Mother and Arrest of a Journalist. The culture of fear, the lack of freedom of expression, impunity, absence of protection of life and human rights, carelessness of the politicians and violence against women they states Attack on Critics is reflected in a recently released song by a group called GSP. The title of the song is a Thong KO, which means fear in English. In that song, the artist said, If we talk against the injustice, the next day you will discover my beheaded body. In this two simple lines, the singer has summed up why a culture of fear and a shrinking space for protest are signs of the time in today's Bangladesh.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:29:16]

I want to thank the four of you for these fascinating insights into great variation of the left realities of authoritarianism in Bangladesh. Before we conclude, I'd like to return to you Arild Engelsen Ruud. In spite of this increasing authoritarianism, Bangladesh still does have an active public life that produces occasional criticism of the government and also of specific policies. Looking ahead, are we going to see more of this in the future, or has authoritarianism already matured into a more stable hegemonic formation that will prove exceedingly difficult to dismantle or dislodge?

Arild Engelsen Ruud

Good question. I mean, it is trying to the edifice our government is trying to establish itself as a hegemonic force in marriage deficit is trying. I'm not sure they're succeeding at the discursive level that too many Bangladeshis are not really very easy to control. You look at social media, there's a lot of input on different from different news sources. There's a lot of criticism of the government still, and even in print media, there is criticism of government. So I don't think that it's really a hegemonic order like that to discuss it level. However, the edifice in itself is strong. It doesn't really bother about some of this criticism, though. There are two or three things that are that are interesting. There's some tension within this edifice. There's clearly a lack of discipline within the army and increasingly so look at the last series of rounds of local elections. More than 100 people have been killed in local elections. They have been mostly Army league workers killed by other Army league workers. That's an interesting thing in itself. There's also a lack of trust amongst some of the arms of government. So the army and the police don't really trust one another all that much. What is really an interesting question is where does the influence, where does the impetus for change, where would it come from? I think one of the really important forces for democracy in the case of Bangladesh would be Western countries. They could push the government a bit, but Western countries also want to do business with Bangladesh. So that's an issue. And and they are really quite ambivalent to the whole question of authoritarianism. We have human rights organisations working for change, but we also have businesses who are very happy to deal with the country as it is. I think one of the really important questions here would be there's also, of course, what Maha referred to as Bangladesh being at the crossroads of a lot of different interests. So there is a Chinese interest, there's an Indian interest in all of this, and no one really wants chaos in Bangladesh. So right now you have a certain stability, which is to everyone's benefit. The really important question is about succession. Right now, the whole edifice is built around the Prime Minister, who is both a very clever, very capable politician, but she's also her father's daughter. So she represents the father of the nation and is dedicated to his legacy, which contributes quite heavily to her legitimacy as the ruler. Now, can some of these the political capability and her legitimacy be transferred to a next generation? That is an open question. And if not, will the edifice hold?

Kenneth Bo Nielsen [00:33:02]

On that note, I want to thank the editors so much for joining us as well as the contributors, “Masks of Authoritarianism, Hegemony, Power and Public Life in Bangladesh”, that we've been discussing today was published by Springer earlier this year. You've been listening to the editors are Arild Engelsen Ruud, and Mubashar Hasan along with contributors Maha Mirza and Asheque Haque. The book is highly recommended reading indeed. My name is Kenneth Bo Nielsen and thank you for joining the Nordic Asia Podcast, showcasing Nordic collaboration in studying Asia.

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