A European Perspective on the Indo-Pacific Transcript

00:00:02

Andreas

This

is the Nordic Asia podcast.

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00:00:09

Andreas

Welcome

to the Nordic Asia podcast, a collaboration across the region that shares expertise on Asia. I'm Andreas Bøje Forsby, researcher at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, NIAS, where I primarily focus on Chinese foreign and security policy. I'm delighted to be joined today by Camilla Sørensen, who is an associate professor at the Danish Royal Defense Academy, at the Institute for Strategy and War Studies. Apart from being a China specialist, Camilla covers a wide array of research areas, including Danish foreign and security policy, great power relations, the Arctic region and also the Indo-Pacific region, which we'll talk about today. Camilla was recently tasked by the Danish government to provide, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an Assessment of current development trends, the in Indo-Pacific as part of the broader analytical exercise ahead of the next five year budget agreement for the Danish defense. While the final report to the government is not due until early 2022, Camilla has been grappling with these issues over the past couple of months and what they mean from a Danish perspective. So just to prepare the ground a bit from the outset, in a geographical sense the Indo-Pacific encompasses the waters and countries bordering the Indian and Pacific oceans stretching from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific Rim states. Politically f ormer Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is often mentioned as the first high profile politician to explicitly link the Pacific and Indian oceans in a political sense. When he gave, in 2007, a speech in the Indian parliament where he talked about the confluence of the Indian and Pacific oceans as seas of freedom and prosperity in the broader Asian region. Since then, and especially over the past few years, the Indo-Pacific has attracted growing attention in international politics and also academia as an arena of geopolitical rivalry, notably the deepning great power rivalry between the US and China, but also of strong geoeconomic dynamics.

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00:02:07

Andreas

Indeed,

the Indo-Pacific region is home to a range of the most economically vibrant countries in the world, and the region has also seen important free trade agreements, including the regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. So Camilla, l et me start by asking you how you understand the growing centrality of the Indo-Pacific and to perhaps ask you a bit more bluntly: To what extent can this be reduced to the broader question of China's rise in the twenty first century?

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00:02:36

Camilla

Well,

first of all, I think it's important, as you already indicate, to underline that the term or concept Indo-Pacific is not really a geographically decided or geographically limited or determined. It is rather this strategic take that defines a part of Asia that the US now especially focus on. As you already mentioned, the concept Indo-Pacific has been used in several years, if not decades, in the region by Japanese, as you mentioned, but also by Indian scholars and politicians. But it is only in recent years when the US has taken up the concept as the overall frame or approach for its strategy to the region, that it gets to be kind of normalized and get to be what all others also now individual European countries and the EU as a whole used to frame their strategic approach to the region. And it shows, I would argue, how the U.S. still holds the ability to shape the world following its interests, that the way that the US military organizes its command now it has a Indo-Pacific Command, well, that that actually matters for the rest of the world. And the rest of the world has to kind of take it serious and organise also their strategic approaches accordingly. And I think this points to how the U.S. has this special role, you could say, in the international system that it's able to to do this. The Chinese still is not able to do this. Right. They can criticize the Indo- Pacific concept, Indo- Pacific approaches from the U.S. and other regional countries, but they can't really come with an alternative. And I think that's an important first point. So and part of this growing centrality of the term Indo-Pacific simply is that it's now the organizing principle for the US approach to the region. So besides that, all the things you say it is of growing centrality for international economy, international politics, it is the region where the US and China most directly confront each other.

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00:04:38

Camilla

It

is the region where China it's China's region, you could say is China's neighbourhood. So it is where China will be able firstly to challenge the US dominant role. The US has been the dominant military power, the dominant you could say, agenda setting power in the region since the end of the Second World War. And this is what China is now really challenging and it plays out militarily, especially in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

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00:05:06

Andreas

All

right. Let's take a look at the Indo-Pacific from a Danish perspective. Why does the Danish government find these development trends important? I mean, given that there is, after all, a small state located far away from Indo-Pacific, and if the Danish government were to formulate an Indo-Pacific strategy like several other European countries that you just mentioned, what would such a strategy look like in your view? I mean, the Danish strategy on the Indo-Pacific.

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00:05:31

Camilla

Well,

I think Denmark is increasingly is and has to direct focus towards Asia, Indo-Pacific due to several reasons, one of the most important reasons is that Denmark is a small, open economy. It relies on free, open trade routes, especially at sea. It is a shipping nation. And here at the Indo-Pacific, the Indian Ocean is increasingly important. It's the most busy ocean now taken over that role from the Atlantic Ocean. It approximately 60 percent of global trade, 90 percent of global oil shipping go through the Indian Ocean. So it's important for Danish economy what is happening in the region. So that's important. It's also important simply for the way that you have big consumer markets. You have the whole increasingly economic importance of the region. So it's important for Danish companies to to be able to trade, produce, et cetera, et cetera, in this region. But I think when we specifically look at Danish security and defense policy, the most important reason is that the U.S. continues to be Denmark's most important ally. And when the U.S. directs primary strategic focus and moves more military capacity to this region, then it will influence Danish foreign security and defence policy simply because when our most important ally changes direction, we also have to change direction. We've seen since the end of the Cold War how Denmark has when when Denmark deploys military force, it is with the U.S. military. Right. So it matters for Danish defense as well. So so I think that's a very important reason that it will come to to influence it will come to present new demands on Danish security and defense policy as well. And a more indirect implication, you could say, is that the U.S. will increasingly pull out of Europe. So it will leave it to its European allies increasingly to take care of European security on their own. So I think that's also an implication that we need to take into account.

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00:07:44

Andreas

OK,

so let's stick to this intensifying geopolitical rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, notably between China and the United States. So together with the its many partners and allies throughout the region, the US military maintains a forward naval presence in the Indo-Pacific a nd and the US Navy regularly conducts military exercises, as well as freedom of navigation operations in the region to enforce the right of all countries to navigate wherever international law permits, I think that's the way the US officially puts it. Now, some European countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, are already becoming increasingly involved with their naval forces in the Indo-Pacific. Why are we seeing European countries getting themselves involved in this way? And do you envision Denmark even taking part in similar activities? I mean, for instance, these frigate joining a US freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea. Is that an option on the table as you see it?

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00:08:44

Camilla

I

think the individual European countries that are active and are getting active in the Indo-Pacific each have their own particular strategic calculation, so a mix of different interests. So but that being said, I think there is a common European interest in trying to guard a rule based order, international agreements, the UN Convention of Law of the Sea, for example, and simply ensure multilateral or promote multilateral solutions, institutions a nd we see that the European countries that are directing their focus towards the region and also the EU are increasingly focusing on or talking about the importance of ASEAN, the organization of Southeast Asian countries. So they have a common interest here in trying to to to guard or promote multilateralism, a kind of a shield towards this great power competition or rivalry, and trying to both find, you could say in the EU and ASEAN both find their own strategic room of maneuver. What the EU calls the strategic autonomy. So I think there is this overall interests and simply a growing acknowledgement in in Europe that if we can call it the future world order, the world order is kind of in flux. And the way that it will continue to develop will depend both economically, politically and security wise a lot on what will happen in Asia. So therefore, they need to be if the EU want to realize what they have promoted themselves in recent in recent years, as more of a geopolitical actor, it has these geopolitical ambitions, then it needs to be more involved. It needs to have influence. It needs to have partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. So so I think this is what's really driving, pushing the EU to focus more on the region. whether we will see Danish, I think what we argue in the report is that it is not unlikely that there will be a request, whether it's from the US or from the UK or other European states that's involved in the region.

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00:10:56

Camilla

A

request for Denmark to contribute with, for example, as you mentioned, a Danish frigate to the Freedom of Navigation operations in the region. I think this is not unlikely because as I mentioned in the beginning, Denmark has often participated with the U.S. since the end of the Cold War in, in military operations and increasingly in recent years also with France. And France is very active in the region conducting Freedom of Navigation operations and this naval diplomacy, you could say, on its own. And France has taken the lead in trying to promote a more independent European naval diplomacy in the region. So I think it's not unlikely there will be a request to Denmark. But whether Denmark will take up that request, I think is very difficult to say, because as we also discussed in the report, there will also be potential costs involved. And, of course, that relates more directly to relations with China. So I think the most important thing now that we also try to highlight in the report is that you increase knowledge about this region in Danish security and defence circles and also prepare for such a request that you are ready and have a strategic awareness about potential cost benefits, about different military deployments to the region.

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00:12:22

Andreas

If

we turn now to the U.S., where the Trump administration launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy in 2019 entitled " A Free and Open Indo-Pacific Advancing a Shared Vision", the Biden administration seems so far to carry on the underlying spirit of this strategy and generally justifies America's increased presence in the region by citing U.S. interests in safeguarding a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific. And this catchphrase about a free and open Indo-Pacific has also become part of the standard language used by many other Western countries when they talk about the Indo-Pacific, a nd you mentioned some of the old European strategies that have been launched recently, we had the one from the European Council as well. And they all use the same language to sort of justify the increased presence or the interest and approach to the Indo-Pacific. We have also seen recently in the joint statements from from not only the Quad, the US, Australia, India and Japan, but also from NATO and the G7 countries when they have the recent summit in Cornwall, that they use the same language when they are justifying an increased focus on the Indo-Pacific. So I'm curious to hear your thoughts about the extent to which China poses a threat to a free, open and perhaps in particular a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific. I mean, there's been a lot of talk in, o ver the past decade at least, about the increased Chinese assertiveness, especially in the maritime domain, but I'm curious about how you position yourself in this debate about China's assertiveness in the region.

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00:13:58

Camilla

Yeah,

that's a difficult one, I would say overall, I would argue for selective assertiveness. And just to elaborate on that, I think we have to acknowledge that China also relies on a free and open transportation route, also relies on a predictable, stable international order, rules-based order. So this has in many ways been a precondition, you could say, for China to develop into what it is today. And China still has a lot of domestic challenges, a lot of issues to deal with that also, you know, calls for, y eah, if it has to succeed in upgrading and restructuring its economy, well, it also needs a stable neighborhood, good relations with neighboring countries, et cetera, et cetera. So in that way, we also have to acknowledge that China's interests and the developments domestically in China is, there is also a need for stability and good relations with neighboring countries. However, a nd now we come to the "However". China these years is also stepping into the role as a great power, the rank as a great power. And with that comes an almost structural, determined, growing confrontation with the U.S.., right? As I mentioned, the US has since the end of the Second World War, been the strongest militarily agenda setting state in the region, in in China's neighborhood. And no great power, I would argue, wants another great power, especially that is, it increasingly sees as an hostile great power to be dominating your your neighborhood. So so this this is what we're seeing now. I would argue that simply China is is trying to push the U.S. further away from from Chinese territory, from the Chinese coast. It's trying to to play a bigger role in setting the rules, setting the agenda in Asia, using a range of tools economically, politically and militarily.

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00:16:04

Camilla

Is

it assertive? It's assertive, yeah. It's almost by definition assertive because it's challenging the established order that we had since the end of the Cold War, right where we have the US as the dominant power, this unipolar, if you want, the unipolar world order. And that's what China is, is challenging will in many ways unavoidably challenge as it's growing. How can that not be revisionist or assertive? I think that's worth really considering. But so I would argue, yes, it's assertive, but it's also to be expected. Right. It's something that we should expect and that we've seen before when we have the rise of new powers. And definitely you can argue that China is doing it in in in a certain way, that the way it plays out, for example, in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea will that's in order to really understand that and explain that, you have to link it up with the specific way that the Chinese state is organized, that the relationship between the Chinese state and the Chinese society, the way that domestic drivers place into the Chinese foreign and security policy, the growing nationalistic expectations domestically. Well, that also plays in, right, in the way Chinese foreign and security policy is developing these years, especially when it comes to these core interests, the interests that are so directly linked up to the legitimacy of the Communist Party in a domestic setting. So some of it is unavoidable, I would say. And some of it is very specifically, unique Chinese assertiveness. So I think we need to see it in that way. Both as what great power, the great power politics dimension of it. China is acting in a very traditional great power way. That being said, it's also acting in specifically Chinese way, which I think in order to understand and explain that and we have to look at the domestic setting as well. And in relation to the challenges the Chinese leaders face domestically and the and the demands, the expectations that faces the Chinese leaders domestically.

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00:18:16

Andreas

Yes.

And if we listen to what is being said by Chinese leaders in Beijing, I mean, over the past few years, we've heard the Chinese officials repeatedly talk about how Washington is orchestrating a containment strategy to slow down or even prevent the rise of China. And Beijing is also recurrently accusing the US of patrimonism and exploiting its great power, status and position in the Asia-Pacific area. So it's along these lines that most observers expect China to pursue a strategy aimed at pushing the Americans out of Asia or even the Indo-Pacific more broadly. But I'm curious about if we know whether Chinese officials have stated such ambitions openly about pushing the U.S. out of the region, and if not, are there any good indications that the Chinese are actually attempting to pursue such a strategy? Nevertheless, I mean, behind the scenes, if they are taking initiatives that are aimed towards preventing or even actively pushing the Americans out of the region in various ways, perhaps by building the economic leverage that can be exploited to force other states to accommodate China's interests with the belt and road initiative or whatever. So how do you see this?

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00:19:36

Camilla

Well,

I think the as as relations between the U.S. and China continues to worsen, I think the ambivalence that China has always had towards the U.S. role in the region is decreasing. So the urge to to push the U.S. out of the region is increasing. Right. That there is simply they've always been ambivalent because it's actually, as I mentioned, it's benefited China that the U.S. has played this this role in stabilizing not only the region, but you can say globally in providing international global good that China's development has really benefited from. It's also the US alliance system in the region has also been a way, you could say seen from China to keep Japan down. It's always been a concern in China w hat would happen if US-Japan alliance would no longer be there? Would you have a Japan that would develop nuclear weapons, for example? So there are concerns as well. And there has been an acknowledgement in China as well that China has fewer benefits, also with a strong US presence globally and also in the region. It's simply provided the stability that I talked about before that's benefited China's development. But I think now the Chinese especially, of course, Chinese scholars. But I also think Chinese leaders in recent years has been more outspoken about their concerns about the way that the US policy in the region is developing, how they, as you also mentioned, see it increasingly focused on containing China, on keeping China weak, on maintaining the US dominant role and not accepting China as an equal great power. And I think they are also more outspoken about how the Chinese policy, how the Chinese ambition, you could say, is increasingly to push the U.S., if not out of the region, then at least further away from from Chinese territory, which makes sense, as we talked about before, seeing it from this great power primarily perspective, I think, was it in 2014 or 2016 when Xi Jinping at the Boao forum also said that Asia is for Asians to decide. So here we are also and we've seen an effort from Chinese leaders, not only Xi Jinping, but also Wang Yi and others, to try to delegitimize the U.S. role in the region, the US new initiatives in the region, such as the Quad and other U.S. initiatives that China clearly sees as part of this US containment of China. So they are more outspoken. And I think this interest, this ambivalence of this interest in actually keeping a strong US presence in the region has definitely decreased as US China relationship worsens, as we see in the U.S. right there is this clear China lens on everything. And also now in Beijing, we have a clear US on everything, right. So this US- China, great power confrontation perspective is clearly dominant in both Washington and Beijing. So that's kind of the frame in which they look at all developments. And that, I think, is increasingly implying that a core focus of the Chinese strategy, also the military strategy, is to push the US further away and ideally out of the region. But of course, the Chinese acknowledge that this is not an easy task and it will take a long time. So I think the first island chain makes sense, there we at least see the military balance shift to China's favor that covers the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. But when we come to the Second Island chain, it's still very difficult. And the Chinese military also acknowledge that.

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00:23:32

Andreas

All

right. Let's turn from great power relations back to our starting point of this conversation, Denmark, since both of us are located in Denmark, because I would like to ask you about the comprehensive strategic partnership that has guided the relations between the market China since 2008. And I find it quite interesting that the two parts have been unable to update the strategic partnership program, which actually expired by the end of 2020. So Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials have suggested that the corona pandemic was to blame for the delay renewing the program. But I think the recently strained bilateral relationship between the two countries also seemed to play at least some role in this. But in your view, will the comprehensive strategic partnership with China survive at a time when Denmark seems to side ever more closely with Washington on a range of issues that are sensitive to China? I'm not just talking about China's investments in Greenland or potential investments or the 5G digital infrastructure, but also issues such as Hong Kong and the Xinjiang region. And I noted that a few weeks ago, the Danish foreign minister Jeppe Kofod referred to China as a systemic competitor, the first time that the U.S. official has used this expression, as far as I'm concerned, at least. So I'm wondering how you see this relationship developing going forward?

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00:24:54

Camilla

I

think there's no doubt that Denmark's China policy is under growing pressure, both from the U.S., as you mentioned, like the U.S. effort to try to get its allies to support a more tough line on China. We saw that with President Biden's trip around Europe a few weeks back, that there is this effort from the US as you also hint that the Denmark is a very loyal US ally. So there is this pressure, but also I think there is a pressure domestically. And the Danish foreign minister Kofod has also launched a more value based Danish foreign policy. So in order to to really deliver on that, at least he's easily criticized by the opposition in Denmark when he's not meeting pro-democracy person that's visiting from Hong Kong, Ted Hui, who visited earlier this year, therefore the Danish foreign minister to meet him. And of course, he was then attacked by the opposition because how was that a value based Danish foreign policy? So I think in Denmark and the Danish China policy is under pressure both externally and internally. I think, however, that there are strong efforts from both sides, both from the Danish side and the Chinese sides, to somehow save the partnership or save the working program. But then when we on the Danish side starts to challenge the Chinese side, as you also mentioned, on these core interests, when we support strong statements on, or not even support, but take the lead in promoting strong international statements on Xinjiang, when the Danish foreign minister I think that was an example you didn't mention when he, the Danish foreign minister, decides to participate in a conference together with the Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen, he also did a few weeks back. Well, then that takes us front and center on the Chinese side. And it's very difficult for, I guess, the what we can assume that there are also people on the Chinese side to try to save this relationship.

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00:26:58

Camilla

It

is very difficult for them. Right, because this issue simply when you challenge core interests, it's really, really difficult. And here we we simply have to to acknowledge that Denmark is not as important as Germany, as France, as the U.K. for China or for Chinese economic interests. So the more selective approach that we've seen and in China's counter-pressure, countermoves, economic coercion, et cetera, in relation to Germany and France and other bigger countries, when they push China on these core interests, here we can expect the Chinese authorities to be tougher on Denmark because Denmark is not that important for China. I still don't think it will be done in a high profile way. So, so it's not like showing an example and use Denmark to show an example. I don't think that's necessarily what we will or is or will be seeing. But I think the Chinese side, because of developments in recent months where they at least we've seen from China, the Danish side is acting in a very, like really challenging China on these core interests. And then the Chinese side will react. I think it will not be as high profile as I mentioned. I think we'll simply see that it will be more difficult for Denmark to get meetings, to get Danish companies involved and big projects in China. Things like that can be more difficult if this plays out over the next months. And as you also indicate, I don't expect that will be a working program coming out anytime soon. It seems to be put on hold from both sides, also from the Chinese side. And if this will be the development, we will see the Chinese side simply canceling meetings, canceling Danish involvements in events and projects in China. What will then be the Danish reaction? I think that's really difficult to say. I don't expect the Danish side really to back down. As you mentioned, the U.S. is our most important ally and the pressure from the US will continue, not pressure, but the push, you could say, from the U.S. I'm not saying that this is only done because of pressure from the US. I think Denmark and other European countries have their own legitimate concerns and interests, that why they are more cautious, why they are more concerned about the developments in China and the Chinese foreign and security policies. So not at all, only because of U.S. pressure. But in this case, I think there will be a focus on supporting the U.S. position on, yeah, simply trying to place Denmark also in this US-China competition or confrontation. And here there's no doubt where Denmark stands. I think the current Danish government has also made that very clear. And that means that on the more overall all in all thing I'm not too optimistic a bout the development in the next year or so on Denmark-China relationship, on this partnership and on the working program being updated anytime soon, unfortunately. So I share your your more pessimistic assessments of that.

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00:30:12

Andreas

All

right, I think we'll end today's podcast here, and you've been listening to the Nordic Asia podcast with me, Andreas Bøje Forsby, and associate professor at the Danish Royal Defense Academy, Camilla Sørensen. Thank you so much for taking the time to talk to me today.

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00:30:28

Camilla

It

was my pleasure. Thanks.

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00:30:32

Andreas

You

have been listening to the Nordic Asia podcast