China's Green Consensus - Transcript

Petra Alderman [00:00:15]

Welcome to the Nordic Asia Podcast, a collaboration sharing expertise on Asia across the Nordic region. I'm Petra Alderman and I am an associate researcher at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at the University of Copenhagen and a postdoctoral research fellow at the International Development Department at the University of Birmingham. In this episode, I am joined by Virginie Arantes, Wiener Anspach Postdoctoral Fellow at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford. Virginie and I first met during my time at Nias, and as it has been the case for many people over the past three years, our meetings have so far been virtual. But hopefully we will have a chance to meet in person soon now that we are both based in the same country. I am absolutely thrilled to welcome you on the Nordic Asia podcast, Virginie. Thanks for accepting my invitation to talk about your newly published book titled 'China's Green Consensus: Participation, Co-optation and Legitimation'. It's been published with Routledge. So first of all, big congratulations on the book publication. This is a great achievement and a great book. It's highly readable and tackles a super interesting topic of China's environmentalism. So I can't really wait to talk to you a bit more about this.

Virginie Arantes [00:01:33]

Well, thank you for having me. It's a pleasure.

Petra Alderman [00:01:35]

Before we actually delve deep into the content of the book and the argument that you made, what was the major motivation for writing this book for you?

Virginie Arantes [00:01:45]

Well, my main motivation for writing this book was to address two issues that I felt were missing in the literature. So, first, when it comes to understanding the impact of environmental policies on the restructuring of the social and the political order in contemporary China, much emphasis in the literature has been placed on assessing how China's state led environmentalism is unfolding on a macro and meso level. But this rich literature as mainly focused on assessing environmental change through top down initiatives by drawing attention to the impact of coercive forms of environmental protection. More recently, however, there are efforts that shed light on the way the Chinese Communist Party is exploiting the environment as a new form of political capital, such as Shapiro and Lee's book China's Goes Green, for instance, which shows how environmental protection in China can also act as a means to an end of authoritarian control. But even in these studies, few assess how this plays out in micro and everyday contexts, and particularly on the part of grassroots organizations and individual actors. So with this book, which is based on my doctoral thesis and in-depth field research in Shanghai, I wanted to contribute to current debates about China's approach to sustainability by examining the effects of China's green turn and environmental policies have on the ground, and more specifically, how it is changing the perceptions, the action and organization of environmental problems by non-state actors and individuals. And secondly, so in addition to contributing to this literature on China's state run environmental protection and how it is transforming state society relations, I also wanted to take a fresh look at the role of both environmental protection and grassroots organizations in authoritarian environments. I started my research in 2015 and at the time looking at the growing number of environmental organizations in China and also focusing on the literature which linked democratic transitions and environmentalism, there was a kind of expectation regarding new civil society openings in China. The Chinese people have become wealthier over the past 30 years, and while several environmental problems have gotten worse, several scholars expected this would lead to the Chinese people yearning for democratic freedoms, rights but also the rule of law. So I set out in 2016 to China based on this literature with an optimistic and now I know perhaps naive prospects of civil society in China. And I found a completely different reality on the ground. So with this book, I wanted to assess the Chinese Communist Party new green strategies on the ground.

Petra Alderman [00:04:54]

I really like the point that you've made about the assumption that environmentalism, especially if it's happening in this authoritarian context, can eventually lead to some kind of democratic awakening, and I guess that's not just something that's been discussed in the context of China, but also in other countries around the world. But before we delve a little bit deeper about this connection and the relationship between the Chinese states or the party's adoption of environmentalism and how it plays out in terms of the civil society relationship with the state. I would like to ask you a little bit more about the adoption of environmentalism by the Chinese Communist Party, because in many ways it's not necessarily something that was actually expected that China would become this major force both at home and abroad in terms of pushing this environmental or sustainability discourse. Why did the party actually decide to adopt this language and this discourse of environmentalism as it's almost like guiding philosophy or principle over the past few years?

Virginie Arantes [00:06:01]

Well, I think China, like every other country in the world, has realized that industrialization and economic development are a double edged sword. So as I just explained, catastrophic environmental situation in China in the early 2010's caused a surge of discontent in Chinese society. In 2015, studies showed that air pollution caused the premature death of 4000 Chinese people every day. So it's no wonder that concerns over pollution and the environment have become one of the top triggers for China's growing social political strife. What's the alarming situation in China even led to terms never heard before. Like, for example, cancer villages. And while public anger rose steeply in the north regarding air pollution, there was also widespread debate over water supplies in the south, which have been accused of raising also cancer at alarming rates. So although the Chinese authorities have spent millions on this problem, according to official standards, in 2015, 85% of the water in the city's major river was undrinkable and more than 66% unfit for any purpose. But it is also important to say that even before Xi Jinping took over the reins of the party and the state, the Chinese leadership recognized the danger of solely putting priorities on economic development with the idea of polluting first and rectifying this later. So in fact, China recognized its environmental problems and had an environmental policy since the 70s, before Deng Xiaoping came to power. But at that time, China decided to prioritize socio-economic development, which was the basis of social stability and an implicit political bargain between the CCP and the general public. But after a rapid economic development, environmental problems were undeniably serious and the authorities saw the increasing number of protests as undermining social stability in major cities like Shanghai, Guangdong or Kunming. So there was really an urgent need to address this issue. And apart from this, China's political leadership claims to follow Marxist-Leninist principles and describes the ecological transformation of society as the next historical step in the development of civilization. So following agricultural and industrial civilization and the degradation it caused on the ecological environment and political leaders are focusing on environmental protection and are attempting to articulate a vision for the future that is still based on economic development but on a sustainable form of development, which is led by the party under its authoritarian party system.

Petra Alderman [00:08:59]

So would it be fair I mean, based on what you said, to say that the turn towards this sort of more explicit environmentalism, at least on part of the party, was partly driven by the actual need of addressing some of the dire ecological problems, but also partly to monopolize the ecological discourse in particular ways so that they can actually then set the lines of what environmental protection is going to look like and how it should be done.

Virginie Arantes [00:09:26]

Yes. Well, I'm sure the Chinese leadership cares about its people, but I think the focus on environmental protection is primarily based on the Chinese leadership's desire to keep the party in power and its legitimacy to be preserved both nationally and internationally. I could give some examples to support this argument. So, for instance, recent studies show that efforts to curb air pollutant emissions, for instance, in developed coastal provinces have actually, I mean these industries have been relocated to interior provinces. So such studies show how pollution effects on public health is unevenly distributed in China. And besides now, new studies show even how this polluting industries and labor intensive industries are now relocated in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia or Vietnam. In the book, I try to show how environmental problems are increasingly being developed in ways that allow the state to recognize environmental protection and the role of civil society in its own image by taking control of the ideology of how environmentalism should be developed in China. For instance, in the book, I focus on cooperative initiatives between the state and grassroots organizations such as Municipal Waste Management, to show how top down policies such as. Establishing a new waste management system. Become trapped between technologies of expert administration and management. So when we explore everyday practices and the co-optation of non-state actors, we can see that such environmental policies increasingly place values and individual responsibility at yours of environmental issues, which pushes the environmental liability from the hands of the state to the individual. And this, I argue in the book, increasingly erases space for debate and creates a kind of consensus that places increasingly responsibility at the individual level without giving space to go against hegemonic discourse of the state on environmental issues.

Petra Alderman [00:11:56]

I think this is also very interesting what you said about shifting of the responsible for the environmental degradation actually from the state onto the individual citizens. Do you have any examples from when you were doing your fieldwork in Shanghai to to illustrate how does it actually look like on an everyday level in China?

Virginie Arantes [00:12:18]

I could particularly see how this unfolded by following environmental organizations in communities in Shanghai. So something I assessed was waste management wear and well, in 2019 the state issued a mandatory waste management system. But actually since the beginning of the 20 tens, there has been a lot of activities by environmental organizations which have been developing this idea of each individual taking care of its waste. So I did my fieldwork before the establishment of this law in 2019, and at the time many interviewees stated that actually they were not the ones responsible to take care of their waste, that it was the government that should tackle these issues. But now we see a change in the narrative and actually environmental organizations are developing this narrative at the community level on increasingly enhancing the role of individuals. So this kind of forecloses the possibilities to criticize the system or even, for example, organizations that focused on degrowth were very careful about how they presented the project because it could go against this this consensus of sustainable development.

Petra Alderman [00:13:52]

Yeah, and I'm glad that you've mentioned it, because China has this grand idea of ecological civilization. Actually, one of the earlier podcast episodes that we've published that was discussing this, and one of the points there was that the ecological civilization itself doesn't necessarily promote degrowth, and that's something that might be important to tackle these environmental problems. So it's like the party is trying to have its cake and eat it in that sense that they want to continue at the rate of the current development. And what you're suggesting is perhaps shifting them the blame onto the individual. What is quite interesting here is the fact that, as you mentioned and correct me if I'm wrong here, but you mentioned that earlier in the 2000's or 2010's, that there was a beginning of potential resistance or criticism from the civil society of the party where all these environmental problems or ecological problems were brought up and there were protests. How did we go from that kind of point to now these, as you describe these civil society organizations, being in a position where they actually help to spread and promote and reinforce this party line narrative about who is responsible, who is to blame and what needs to be done to protect the environment.

Virginie Arantes [00:15:08]

Actually, in the book, I defend the idea that the environment actually never put the party in danger. So normally the blame and environmental movements were directed to certain industries or local governments. A lot of movements called on to the central level to tackle the issue. So this is a first point. Then since the beginning of the 20 tens and increasingly since shooting took power, there has been numerous policies that have restricted the activity of grassroots organizations with two laws that came to constrain the registration of non-state actors in China. And environmental activists also started to be detained. Xi Jinping embodied this ecological civilization which. Was not new and took this concept to unprecedented heights in 2018 when it was registered in the Constitution. All these kind of selected the kinds of environmental organizations that can pursue their activities in China, the ones who are still working currently normally focus on issues that go in line with the state and actually address questions. The state is not able to respond. This increasing focus on ecological civilization and the fact that the party and the state put themselves at the forefront of environmental protection actually articulate, certain or frame certain, agreed and tolerated objectives in which then environmental organization which can be co-opted because they think they will be able to perform their agenda by working closely with the state to pursue their objectives.

Petra Alderman [00:17:09]

It really is just a managed way of approaching environmental conservation. And I guess from what you said is that there's not much opportunities for these organizations to push for bottom up solutions in terms of approaching the environment and suggesting, well, actually, maybe we should try this here because this is what would work best.

Virginie Arantes [00:17:30]

Yes, that's perfectly right. As many interviewees and organizations leaders stated, it is very hard to go against the main narrative when the narrative is said to be protecting or engaging to attain your own goals. So it really creates a closed frame where ideal visions of sustainability are developed and it is very difficult to argue against. Actually, this is increasingly true in urbanization processes.

Petra Alderman [00:18:08]

Could you give us an example of how that plays out in these urbanization processes?

Virginie Arantes [00:18:12]

Sustainability has become an integral part of China's guiding political ideology. So in the book, besides focusing on non-state actors, you also use China's largest city as a setting to assess the promotion of this consensual narratives of sustainable urbanism. I argue the city functions as the perfect backdrop to assess China's environmental authoritarian governance processes. And here I use the concepts of environmental authoritarianism, meaning the use of environmental narratives to attain authoritarian goals. Contrary to another literature which focuses on authoritarian environmentalism, which means the use of authoritarian mechanisms to attain environmental goals. So through ethnography grounded details, I try to show how China's green consensus colonizes the urban sphere. Urbanization has long been recognized as a vital part of states and designed to serve their own interests. Cities such as Shanghai have come to play a major role in performing this new ideal image of China domestically and abroad. In the book, take, for example, Shanghai 2035, which is the master plan for environmental protection reforms to show how urbanization processes and goals are designed in a way that diffuse and create hegemonic consenses on ideal visions of the city. There's a lot of literature stating that this, for example, the concept of eco city or sustainable city function as empty signifiers so they can mean everything and anything at this time. And so how does sustainability? Urbanization are used to constrain the actions of non-state actors, but also to create ideal visions of what it is to be an environmental citizen in a developed ecological city.

Petra Alderman [00:20:22]

The last question that I would be really interested to ask is to maybe get a little bit of your own view on China's environmentalism. And given what you said, that a large extent this is more of an instrumental strategy of keeping in power, you know, staying legitimate in the eyes of the citizen. How risky do you think this strategy in the long term?

Virginie Arantes [00:20:44]

Well, this is an interesting question, but I mean, it's the book of Shapiro and Li, 'China Goes Green' that mainly tackles the underpinnings of this environmental authoritarian way of governing. So, yeah, the main argument in the book is to focus on the concept of post-politics to show how the state has changed from an attitude of avoidance of the problem. Even though I stated that they knew it was already a problem to an instrumentalist of environmental issues. And I try to show how re-take of environmental issues as ideology of the party forecloses basis for other visions of sustainability to emerge among civil society. It relates to this all this literature on post politics actually. So when it comes to foreclosing all spaces and opportunities for civil society to engage in contemporary issues such as environmental issues, for example, not having a space for civil society to function as a whistleblower when there is a problem on environmental issues considerably puts the party and the state's ability to see an emerging problem before it's too late, as the Covid 19 showed. So, as with this Doctor that tried to alarm its superiors. So he was silenced. And so this attitude of the party and the state to increasingly restrict citizens and other voices from appearing in the public sphere in China actually I think ends up by creating pressures that could have been avoided otherwise.

Petra Alderman [00:22:32]

Thank you very much for a real insightful discussion on China's environmentalism and how it has been instrumentalized with a view of foreclosing the civil society space in China around the environmental issues. Thank you very much for for joining the Nordic Asia podcast. I really enjoyed the conversation with you today and I hope we'll get a chance to talk about this topic again.

Virginie Arantes [00:22:55]

Thank you for having me.

Petra Alderman [00:22:56]

Thank you for joining the Nordic Asia podcast showcasing Nordic collaboration in studying Asia. I'm Petra Alderman, associate researcher at the Nordic Institute of Asia Studies at the University of Copenhagen and Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the International Development Department at the University of Birmingham. I've been talking today to Virginie Arantes, a Anspach postdoctoral fellow at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford. Thank you for listening.

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