Security in Asia
Power and Challenges in the Organization of Asian Security and Cooperation
Changing Security Structure in Asia? China and Multilateralism
India, the United States and the Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons
Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies
A Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula: Six Parties – Zero Trust
Southeast Asian Security: A Short History
Can the EU Play a Meaningful Role in Asian Security?

THEME:
Security in Asia
Security of Asians is largely dependent on the Asian ability to prevent intra-state violence: mainly state repression and civil wars. However, traditional Asian inter-state security threats also possess a vast potential for destruction. The three possible nuclear war scenarios of Asia – Kashmir, Taiwan and Korea – are probably the only foreseeable war scenarios in the world where the number of casualties could be counted in millions, or even tens of millions. Thus the inter-state security also deserves some attention. NIAS, together with its Nordic, European and global network, gave this attention, by producing a report on ‘The Security Situation in Asia: Changing Regional Security Structure?’ to the Danish Foreign Ministry. Many of the articles of this NIASnytt issue summarize some of the central themes of that report.

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The Death of Distance

Nearly ten years ago, in her book *The Death of Distance*, Frances Cairncross of *The Economist* wrote that the growing ease and speed of communication is creating a world where distance has little to do with our ability to work or interact together. Cairncross wrote from a business perspective, looking at work patterns and how companies organize themselves.

Easy access to information, wherever it is in the world, is now taken for granted by many of us. It can, however, have new and unexpected consequences, an example being the recent furor about the Muhammad cartoons (first published in the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*). The local anger expressed across the globe was a timely reminder that Western values are not universally accepted; indeed, their expression can be a dangerous form of provincialism. Not least, it should now be quite clear to all politicians – be they in Copenhagen, Caracas or Calcutta – that the days have gone when domestic agendas could be pursued with no thought to the outside world. Bad news is just a text message away.

Nor is it just journalists or politicians affected. All of us – ordinary people from all parts of the world – are now much closer together than we had imagined. The experience has not proved comfortable. Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has described the cartoon controversy as Denmark's worst international crisis since World War II. Danish products have been boycotted in the Muslim world. Several Danish embassies have been attacked and in some cases destroyed; others have closed. On security grounds, Danes in many Muslim countries have been advised to leave. Other Nordic countries and their people – not least the Norwegians – have also suffered.

What should concern us now, however, is the realization that improved communication does not necessarily promote understanding; proximity can exacerbate conflict. This was very clear in the cartoons controversy. Critics said that the cartoons were culturally insensitive, insulting and blasphemous. However, supporters of their publication said the cartoonists and newspapers exercised the right of free speech. Arguably, this was a case where people clearly communicated their beliefs but actually talked past each other.

The only way out of such 'culture wars' is perhaps by the growth of an understanding between peoples based on knowledge, tolerance and acceptance. The immediate issue with the cartoons controversy is bridging the perceived rift between the Muslim world and the West. But clearly, as can be seen in the pages that follow, misunderstandings and conflict are also found beyond the Middle East; we thus need to think in global terms.

In this global world, Asia is unavoidable, Asia matters. Much of the world's population lives in Asia. The richest and poorest people live here, often side by side. Here can be found the biggest and fastest growing cities, likewise rapidly expanding economies that soon are likely to overtake those of the West. Here, too, all the world's major religions are found as well as all the world's various political, economic and social systems. And – as will be seen in this issue of NIASnytt – Asia is especially important in security terms. Today, conflicts centred on Kashmir, Taiwan and the Korean peninsula are where there is the greatest chance of nuclear war erupting, with casualties numbering in the millions if not tens of millions.

From this perspective, the cartoons controversy has not been all bad news. It is also a wake-up call for all of us to build greater understanding among peoples. In building such an understanding, the role of politicians, diplomats, business people and journalists (even cartoonists!) will be important but it would be unwise to assume that all are fluent in cross-cultural understanding and communication. Also needed from all parts of the globe are contributions from institutes like NIAS, institutes with staff specialized in area studies. Not least, the world needs the insights of scholars deeply versed in the norms and values that currently inform different people's lives and understanding, as well as in the religions and philosophies forming the basis of everyday world-views.

Thus we would like to remind all our friends and colleagues in Asian studies as you go about your daily tasks or (as now) contemplate complex issues like those raised in this issue of NIASnytt: the communications revolution has annihilated distance and exposed cultural fissures world-wide. But your work bridges the divide; your contribution is important.
Security in Asia
By Timo Kivimäki

Security of Asians is largely dependent on the Asian ability to prevent intra-state violence: mainly state repression and civil wars. These two sources of violence have contributed to up to 90 percent of conflict casualties in Asia during the past 50 years. This is why violent repression and civil wars are the main focus of the NIAS research theme ‘Violence, security needs and regional cooperation in Asia’ (for more information on this theme, see http://www.nias.ku.dk/research/themes/violence.asp?who=researchers). Some of the pictures in this NIASnytt issue are from NIAS conflict prevention lectures in Indonesian conflict areas. Since 2003, NIAS has been managing and partly implementing an Asia Link project (www.icsnasialink.net) for the University of Helsinki, with an aim to expose Indonesian Universities, civil servants, police personnel, military officials, NGOs and the media to the Nordic peace research tradition.

NIAS collaboration in a project Building Multilateral Conflict Prevention in East and Southeast Asia of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs also focused on the non-traditional security dimension in Asia by mobilizing the ASEAN Regional Forum Expert and Eminent People’s group in Kuala Lumpur in October 2005. Some of the pictures in this NIASnytt issue are from that meeting.

However, traditional Asian inter-state security threats also possess a vast potential for destruction. The three possible nuclear war scenarios of Asia – Kashmir, Taiwan and Korea – are probably the only foreseeable war scenarios in the world where the number of casualties could be counted in millions, or even tens of millions. Thus the inter-state security also deserves some attention. NIAS, together with its Nordic, European and global network, gave this attention, by producing a report on The Security Situation in Asia: Changing Regional Security Structure to the Danish Foreign Ministry in summer 2005. The report can be downloaded in its entirety from the Danish Foreign Ministry site, at http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/7A8AB54B-0068-4C0F-BBCC-B7B269E66ECF/0/Asiansecurityreport.pdf%20.

Many of the articles of this NIASnytt issue summarize some of the central themes of that report. Marie Söderberg’s article, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies, Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen’s and Clemens Stubbe Østergaard’s article, Changing Security Structure in Asia– China and Multilateralism and my own article on Southeast Asian security all derive from some of the central themes of the report, while Nis Høyrup Christensen’s and Geir Helgesen’s article A Nuclear Free Korean Peninsula: Six Parties – Zero trust is based on the central conclusions of the above mentioned report, but also on another NIAS report to the Danish Foreign Ministry on North Korea’s Economic, Political and Social Situation.

Phar Kim Beng’s article on the emerging East Asian security architecture represent the ongoing research and publishing cooperation between NIAS and the author, while Walter Andersen’s article India, the United States and the Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons is based on a NIAS lecture the author gave in the autumn of 2005. Together with the NIAS advisory role in the Aceh Peace Talks, which was discussed in the NIASnytt special tsunami issue (2/2005), these articles and pictures offer you the highlights of NIAS’ activities in 2005 concerning Asian security and conflicts.
Power and Challenges in the Organization of Asian Security and Cooperation

By Phar Kim Beng

Avoiding hegemony, great power chauvinism, security dilemma, arms race, containment, and dominance have been the staple themes in Asian statecraft. In some cases, these priorities, which in modern speak could perhaps be defined as ‘national interest,’ even precede the existence of the nation states themselves, or for that matter, Western colonialism in sixteenth century. The differing sizes of Asian sultanates, kingdoms and feudal polities, all within the midst of great civilizations like China, India and Japan, have placed a premium on mitigating the power and penetration of the bigger neighbours. Although the process to build an East Asia community has never been characterized in such terms, due to the contemporary emphasis on commerce and trade, the strategic thrust towards creating some form of modus vivendi that would allow all countries to co-exist peacefully is hard to ignore.

On 17 December 2005, the term ‘East Asia Summit’ (EAS) not only entered the lexicon of regional security, but has begun to pave the way towards creating this pacific impulse; one which is rooted in avoiding the realist pressures that have been with the region for close to a millennium. Will EAS succeed? There is every reason to hope that it will, though there will be many obstacles and challenges along the way.

In the first EAS, the leaders of all 10 ASEAN countries, plus China, Japan and South Korea, have begun to decide on three key issues:

A. how often should the East Asian summit be convened;
B. should the East Asian summit be organized independently (with its own secretariat); or
C. should it continue to rely on the support of ASEAN (and by extension, the ASEAN secretariat)?

Of the three issues above, the last once again leans on ASEAN to provide various forms of logistical and administrative support to allow EAS to gain its footing.

There is an implicit wisdom in allowing this to take place. This is because any early attempts to de-link the future EAS from ASEAN will create enormous fear in the latter. The reason is purely economic, which in turn produces other political and military ramifications: due to the combined economic power of the three East Asian giants, the leaders in China, Japan and Korea want Southeast Asia to believe that ASEAN can still play a leading role in promoting East Asian regionalism. This ‘polite fiction’ will be akin to the proverbial big brother allowing the younger siblings to have an equal say in the family.

**ASEAN in the driving seat**

By all measures, Southeast Asia has sought to concentrate the minds of decision makers and leaders in the region on confidence building, peace keeping, maritime security and transnational crime; four issues deemed important by ARF.

Southeast Asia has been able to achieve that by creating a network of think-tanks known as the Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) to examine these four clusters of issues on a regular basis.

Although the frequency has substantially decreased, such policy exercises were, and still are, conducted with think-tanks in Australia, Canada, Japan, China, South Korea, New Zealand and the United States.

**The diplomatic oddity and the seven milestones**

Yet, having said thus, the leading role of Southeast Asia does not come without the scrutiny of the more powerful members.

Astute observers have pointed to the anomaly of the ‘weak’ leading the ‘strong’. This is because by various measures,
countries in Southeast Asia are significantly weaker than China, Korea, Japan and of course the U.S.

Yet, over the last 10 years the international relations of East Asia have produced something that amounts to a ‘diplomatic oddity’, where the weak coalition of countries in Southeast Asia has tried to ‘shepherd’ the major powers. This situation is set to repeat at future East Asian Summits, with Malaysia already showing the way.

At the second East Asia forum on 6 December 2004 in Kuala Lumpur, which was attended by the likes of Dr Mahathir Mohammad – who first espoused the importance of one East Asia – former President Kim Dae Jung of Korea and former Japanese Prime Minister Tsutomo Hata, seven ‘milestones’ were laid down for the creation of an East Asian community.

They were established by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Abdullah Badawi. These seven milestones, which did not invite any strong opposition from other countries, were:

- holding the East Asia Summit;
- drawing up a charter of the East Asia community;
- establishing an East Asia free trade area;
- having an agreement on East Asia monetary and financial co-operation;
- establishing an East Asia zone of amity and co-operation;
- setting up an East Asia transportation and communications network; and
- drawing up an East Asia declaration of human rights and obligations.

Mechanisms of Control

Although some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have lamented the fact that human rights have been placed at the end of the milestones list, the goal of Malaysia is to prevent member states in East Asia from any early controversy that can potentially derail the process of reinforcing the EAS. This tactic is accepted by other countries too.

Another mechanism that will ‘define’ the process in the EAS is the conditions with which a new member would have to satisfy before it could be admitted.

Through various deliberations of Northeast Asian Think Tanks (NEAT I and II) in Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo, which is a parallel network of think-tanks formed with the goal to tackle issues specific to EAS, members of these meetings have decided that any countries aspiring to join the EAS or, in future, the East Asia community, shall have to satisfy three criteria first:

1. They must first accede to the Treaty of Amity, Cooperation, and Friendship (TAC) of ASEAN which demand the renunciation of force as a policy instrument in the settlement of disputes;
2. They must already have ‘substantial relations’ with East Asia, or seek to have substantial relations with the region;
3. The decision of the membership shall be decided only by the consensus of the member states.

Signing on to TAC and the power of the US

Countries like India, Australia and New Zealand have acceded to TAC. Their membership applications were supported by all member states of ASEAN. However, on a case by case basis, India’s participation in EAS was due to Malaysia’s strong support; while Australia and New Zealand were both backed by Indonesia. The rest of the countries in EAS were then pressured to accept them through consensus in Kuala Lumpur.

However, joining EAS is not only dependent on satisfying the conditions. The power of the US can have a tremendous ‘outside’ influence too. Take Australia and Russia, for instance.

Although Canberra, under the leadership of Prime Minister John Howard was reluctant to sign the TAC at first — this in view of the fact that Australia may not be able to launch preemptive counter terrorism operations in Indonesia in the event of a terrorist threat — Australia was nevertheless persuaded by the US to agree to it. By the dint of this action, the US has Australia as its ‘eyes and ears’ in the EAS.

Russia, on the other hand, wants to be a part of the EAS, even though it means acceding to the TAC in Kuala Lumpur. While Malaysia was happy to endorse its membership application, Russia was not a strong ally of the US, and the US did not yet want to see Russia in the EAS when it was uncertain whether the EAS would be a bone or a bane to US interest.

Therefore, Singapore, which has traditionally been a strong ally of the US in Southeast Asia, raised the objection to Russian inclusion — on the argument that Russia still did not satisfy the criterion of ‘substantial relations’.

For what it was worth, Singapore’s argument was weak, officials in Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed. This is because at the time of New Zealand’s admission, it did not have ‘substantial relations’ with the region too. Despite this counter argument, Russia was kept out on the power consideration of the US, albeit via the objection of Singapore.

Through the Russian and Australian cases, one can see that although Southeast Asia seeks to
lead East Asia and pave the way for the region to avoid hegemony and dominance, its strategy is not fool proof.

The power of the US in EAS could be felt through the surrogate role played by Singapore, or in future, Australia and Japan too, both of which are close allies of the US as well.

Of course, this has created a very interesting setting, because just as the US has begun ‘injecting’ its influence into East Asia without becoming a member, current and future efforts would be also balanced or countered by China.

Indeed, Japanese scholars who understand the political establishment in China have claimed that China is no longer as enthusiastic about EAS as it used to be. This is because it has become too large; not unlike a big and ineffectual APEC. But to the extent that China feels that EAS would be controlled by the US or other powers allied to it, one can be certain that China will come back into the fray.

Hence, the degree to which Southeast Asia may control the future of East Asian Summit will also depend on US relations with China, as well as the maneuverings of each to court the support of the other member states.

The long and arduous journey to one East Asia

Countries such as Japan that agreed to join the EAS ostensibly to avoid regional power politics will increasingly find that the process towards one East Asian community takes time and has many difficulties.

Take the example of ASEAN, for instance. Notwithstanding its smaller size, a series of 75 steps have been drawn up by Indonesia, with the support of the ASEAN Secretariat, to simultaneously create one Southeast Asian security, economic and cultural community by 2020. This is consistent with the Hanoi Plan of Action to make Southeast Asia one region in the truest sense of the word.

Yet no leader in Southeast Asia truly believes that the 75 steps are practical, in spite of the fact that Southeast Asia has been trying to promote regional economic cooperation since 1967, only to formally move to political and security cooperation in 1992.

Indeed, as soon as the markers for political and security cooperation were laid down in 1992, ASEAN decided that it was best to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) first.

Furthermore, in spite of the economic thrust of ASEAN, the kind of regionalism exhibited in Southeast Asia over the last 13 years is still not geared towards creating a community. This is because AFTA is a form of ‘negative integration’: it brings down tax barriers and commercial duties across the region to as low as zero or 5 per cent. Yet even as the taxes and duties are dismantled, the people in Southeast Asia would still not be able to travel to each other’s countries freely.

Hence, for East Asia to become one community – a dream first explored by intellectuals like Rabinath Tagore in India and Tenshin Okakura of Japan almost a century ago – all member states would have to agree on the ‘threats’ which they face, since nothing brings a community together like common fear.

When member states have a common fear of something (or some country) then they will be able to overcome their mistrust and lack of confidence in order to work together. Sovereignty can then be ‘pooled’ to allow policies to converge. Will EAS have that?

Regionalism succeeds when there is common fear

One hundred years ago, such a fear existed in the region. It revolved around the Western imperialism of the colonial powers, such as Britain, France, Holland and even the United States, which was making its presence felt in the Philippines.

However, since the end of World War II, these countries have formally left East Asia. The last withdrawal from East Asia was seen in Portugal’s return of Macao to China in 1999.

Although the US still maintains forward military bases in South Korea and Japan, these are forces that are kept with the consent of Seoul and Tokyo. Even China is not altogether against the idea of having them, despite Beijing’s occasional assertion that it is ‘encircled’ by the US.

This is because China is aware that should the US withdraw completely from Korea and Japan, both countries will resort to a more independent military policy and posture. Such actions would lead to an expensive arms race between China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea: exactly what all of them seek to avoid by first joining EAS in the first place. An arms race as a result of the security dilemma would be detrimental to the economic modernization of China.

So, while the member states of EAS may have the laudable goal of creating one region, the absence of a common fear will mean that their dedication to creating it will for now be rhetorical at best and fallacious at worst until they develop or acquire a common fear to make them feel a shared sense of vulnerability.

Yet all is not lost. Like many other things in international relations, each development is contingent on the others. As the
‘threats’ facing East Asia become increasingly diffuse and hybridized – as the threats that confront member states of EAS have been – member states have to ‘learn’ how to work closely together.

As can be seen in Box A, the serious threats that East Asia has confronted over the past decade were not ‘country-specific’ threats’ or invasion. Rather, they were highly lethal, evolved and organic threats that range from infectious diseases to terrorism. All these threats have had four key features that East Asia cannot ignore either now or in future:

- A. They are highly globalized (aided by globalization of travels and communication);
- B. They must be managed with international partners;
- C. They are immensely unpredictable; and
- D. They are also extremely contagious (in the financial, political and other senses).

**Box A: Serious threats to East Asia 1995–2005**

2. Attacks on the US on September 11th 2001
3. Bombings in Kuta, Bali on October 12 2002
4. SARS in 2003
5. Tsunami in 2004
6. Bird flu 2005

Borderless threats

A bird flu outbreak in Indonesia, for instance, could affect the entire region, if not the worlds; just as the Asian financial crisis did.

To the extent leaders and policy makers, especially the intellectuals in think-tanks, are able to ‘process’ these threats collectively, then future EAS would be able to work together towards creating a common region based on one vision, mission and identity.

If not, leaders in Southeast Asia will try to lead the formation of East Asia community – obviously with the goal of not being dominated by more powerful members – without actually being able to control the direction.

This is because in the next 15 years, all the great powers will effectively become ‘greater’ and more engaged with each other. At least, three strategic tensions will occur in East Asia, as shown in Box B.

**Box B: Strategic tensions in East Asia**

1. China and Japan will have their own bilateral relations based on balancing each other.
2. The United States will have strong bilateral relations with Australia, Japan, and India to counter an emerging China.
3. India will consolidate its relations with Russia and Southeast Asia to prevent the rise of China, and to avoid being overly reliant on the US.

Tensions by import

All these strategic tensions will be ‘imported’ into the EAS and community building process. They will complicate the latter. They will also transform the EAS into an arena where platitudes (i.e. rhetoric) are constantly being made without any policy actions to foster true identity or unity. Therefore, whether an East Asia community will rise or fall will depend on the quality and amount of learning the leaders may internalize about the true threats that they face.

If they still see threats through nationalistic prism, without considering their regional and global characteristics, their countries’ policies will not converge with each other. Rather, they will diverge as a result of an inability to resist nationalism in favour of regionalism.
Changing Security Structure in Asia? China and Multilateralism

By Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen and Clemens Stubbe Østergaard

The recent changes in the security structure in Asia are primarily driven by the "rise of China". The changes not only relate to the often mentioned increase in the Chinese economic and military capabilities, but also to the fact that China during the last ten years has made a major shift in its perceptions and preferences regarding foreign policy instruments. The Chinese today have a much more positive perception of multilateral instruments and this is strongly influencing the development of China's image in the region and its relationships to the regional states. Generally, Chinese economic development and attractiveness together with its increased involvement in regional multilateral arrangements has increased the regional states' confidence in China as a constructive regional power and has strengthened China's economic and political relations with nearly all states in the region.

The importance of multilateral instruments in China’s foreign and security policy

In October, China played host to the G-20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank directors from the worlds most important economies. It was the most recent sign of a multilateralism which is also discernable in the field of security. In this article we want to give an insight into this particular aspect of Chinese foreign and security policy. In this way we also present our argument for answering yes to the question about whether the security structure in Asia is changing, although we believe that it is still too early to say whether this will lead to increased conflict or increased cooperation in the region.

New Chinese security concept – rethinking traditional principles

From the mid-1990’s, China’s leaders concluded that the nation’s interests should focus on the Asian region and on ensuring its security and economic development. This was partly a reaction to the increasing talk and fear of a “China threat” in the region (and in some circles in the U. S.), and partly because of a more realistic Chinese perception of the international security structure: the Chinese realised that the U.S. would have a dominant position for many years to come. Thus, particularly since the mid-1990s, Chinese diplomatic efforts and its wider foreign and security strategy have been focused on the region, the states in its periphery. In parallel to this, a new Chinese security concept – ‘cooperative security’ – started to develop. It builds on ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, developed with India in the mid-1950s, emphasizing sovereignty, the diversity of political systems, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit. However, the new concept entails a more comprehensive view of national security interests, including emphasis on economic development and rising living standards, and on a more pragmatic and less ideological perception of the regional and international security environment. Following this rethinking of principles, the new concept includes a much more positive Chinese attitude towards regional and global cooperation and institutions. It is a far more proactive and flexible approach, including a new preparedness to take initiatives in multilateral settings. Earlier, China saw multilateral institutions mostly as a limitation on Chinese policy and strategy, (which it preferred to exercise bilaterally) and as a potential instrument for hostile states to keep China down and to control it. The last decade has clearly seen growing Chinese enthusiasm for multilateral arrangements.

Learning from the ASEAN Way?

In the course of a decade China went from putting a toe in the multilateral water, to splashing confidently around in this novel sea. The changing Chinese perception and use of regional multilateral instruments were first clearly visible in relation to China’s interaction with ASEAN, where from the beginning of the 1990s it engaged in an increased number of ASEAN agreements and activities. This was mostly in relation to China’s economic cooperation with ASEAN members, but gradually China also became strongly engaged in ASEAN activities in the political
and security areas. An increased and diversified Chinese engagement and role has been the policy, particularly in contexts like ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The results include China joining the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signing the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, initiating the wide-ranging Pan-Asian Trade Pact, hosting the first ASEAN Security Conference in Beijing last year and participating in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea. It is nevertheless in founding and promoting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), initially the Shanghai Five, that China has most clearly taken a leading role. The SCO members are China, Russia and the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) but as these strengthen their cooperation, especially in the security and economic areas, observer states India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia are scheduled to become full members. In the last year China has also been playing a leading role in relation to the first East Asian Summit which is to be held in Malaysia in December. However, here the Chinese role has been more ‘behind the scenes’ to reduce political difficulties for the participation of the Japanese in particular, but also some ASEAN states that have strong security relations within the U.S. The East Asian Summit will bring together the ASEAN Plus Three as well as India, Australia and New Zealand.

Which motives behind?
The motives behind China’s more active diplomacy and use of multilateral instruments can – and must – be discussed. It is a result of globalisation, increased interdependence and socialisation or is it more a result of Chinese power-political considerations, where the primary motives are to promote China’s national economic, political and security interests? It is most likely a combination of the above mentioned factors. However, it is clear that there is a strong power-political motive behind it, as China counteracts what it perceives as increased American efforts to encircle or contain China by obvious strengthening of the American military presence in and relations to states around China, especially Japan. Thus, the Chinese increasingly see a leading role for their nation in multilateral regional organizations of all kinds, as a counterweight to the strengthened security cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. By generous deals strengthening economic and security cooperation and partnerships in the region, China aims to increase the regional states’ trust in and dependence on China, so they will not go against China. It is better to do this ‘the multilateral way’ than the ‘bilateral way’, because ‘the multilateral way’ is less alarming to the U.S., and does put the regional states in a difficult position of feeling that they have to chose between the U.S. and China. This Chinese strategy has clearly yielded positive gains in Southeast and Central Asia, where the Chinese engagement in multilateral settings, and the perceived higher Chinese responsiveness to the regional states economic and security concerns are strongly appreciated, particularly after the turbulence of the Asian financial crisis.

Changing regional security structure – the challenge for China and external states
While China is increasing its influence and position in the region through patient diplomacy, summits and multilateral engagement, the opposite seems to be happening to the U.S. This may be due to its neglect of diplomacy in favour of the military means. Focusing narrowly on the fight against terrorism and the Middle East, the U.S. may be losing influence and attraction – what Joseph Nye calls ‘soft power’ – by pursuing what some Asian states see as a unilateral and aggressive policy that does not take the Asian states’ security worries into consideration. Japan seems to be the one exception, gradually but continually over the last ten years greatly strengthening its security alliance and military cooperation with the U.S. The repercussions of this particular choice of regional security strategy will be very interesting to follow in coming years, and it will be decisive for the development in China’s foreign and security policy, and for China’s future role and image in the regional and international system.

How will we know whether China’s choice of multilateralism is tactics, adaptation, a real learning process or perhaps a mix, adaptive learning? How dependent is the policy’s resilience on encouragement from other states? Do motivation and will vary over functional areas? Many of the answers will be found in further empirical work on the East Asian region. The changing regional security structure, together with developments in the most important security issues for the Chinese, such as Taiwan, relations to Japan and the U.S., and the Korean Peninsula, may in the years to come challenge China’s regional diplomacy and its will to work multilaterally. There is at present no guarantee that future Chinese
India, the United States and the Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons

By Walter Andersen

The Joint US–Indian Statement issued on July 18 2005 unveiled a major shift in US policy on nuclear non-proliferation – and perhaps a change in the way international non-proliferation regimes carry out their policies. The Joint Statement also significantly reinforced an earlier US decision to develop a strategic relationship with India. The Statement proposed the removal of all restrictions on high technology exports to India. Thus the legal problems that had previously complicated implementation of the US-Indian strategic cooperation would be removed without simultaneously demanding that India abandon its nuclear weapons program or promise to put limits on its nuclear weapons program. The Joint Statement commits the Bush Administration to get the US Congress to amend non-proliferation legislation and to get similar approval to exempt India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an international consortium of 45 countries.

A ‘realist’ US approach

The non-proliferation exception for India is an indication of a ‘realist’ perspective that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice seems to have adopted, in marked contrast to so many decisions taken in the Bush administration’s first term, most prominently Iraq. What then is ‘realistic’ about making India an exception to US non-proliferation legislation? First, it is the culmination of a decision reached at the end of the Clinton administration that India would not roll back and eventually abandon its nuclear weapons program. India faces a nuclear China to the north and a nuclear Pakistan to the west – and there is a history of cooperation on nuclear matters between these two countries. Beyond this, what is new is the apparent conclusion that India’s nuclear program is not a threat to US interests and that the strengthening of Indian security reinforces US interest in an Asian balance of power, particularly as a counter-weight to China.

Strengthening the Indian economy is also in the US interest because it enhances Indian security. The robust Indian economy needs to significantly boost its commercial energy supplies – by about six per cent annually – to sustain the present rapid rate of growth. While critics correctly point out that only about three percent of India’s electrical needs come from nuclear plants, many Indian experts argue that a reason for this low level is that a lack of access to appropriate high technology has made Indian nuclear plants expensive to build and inefficient to maintain. The likely continuation of high oil and gas prices makes nuclear-generated fuel increasingly attractive. The Joint Statement could also pave the way for Indo-US cooperation on other energy-related projects, including the US providing India with clean-coal and renewable energy technology.

Indian obligations

The obligations assumed by India in the Joint Statement have important tactical implications both in the US and in India because they will influence support for the agreement in both countries. The Joint Statement pledges India to:

1) separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities;
2) place all civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards, but short of the ‘full scope’ safeguards now required by US law and international non-proliferation regimes;
3) support an additional IAEA protocol, which gives additional powers to the IAEA to verify safeguards and is negotiated separately with each country;
4) continue the moratorium on nuclear tests, though stopping short of adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
5) work for a proposed fissile fuel cut-off treaty.

During the intense negotiations in the wording of the Joint Statement, the Indian side successfully demanded that the commitments commence ‘in a phased manner’, meaning that the process would be governed by reciprocity and at a rate considered politically expedient. The negotiators correctly assumed that criticism in India would focus on the charge that India was giving up something tangible for mere promises from the US. This charge has in fact emerged from both the far right and the far left in Indian politics. Critics on the left have argued that the Indo-
US agreement ‘marks an end’ to India’s nuclear disarmament policy and subverts India’s interests in spreading democracy and combating terrorism.6 Leftist parties have also pointed to limits to the ‘strategic friendship’, notably Washington’s lack of support on India’s claim for a Security Council seat and its refusal formally to recognize India as a nuclear weapons power. The other major criticisms that have emerged in India are that the deal would place limits on the size of India’s nuclear arsenal and would foster dependence on US technology.7

While most of India’s nuclear scientists believe the accord will mitigate fuel shortages by accelerating the country’s nuclear energy program, many are also concerned that India’s domestic nuclear program will be supplanted by cheaper foreign technologies. Scientists have also objected to the separation of military and civilian nuclear facilities, arguing that separating the small-scale military activities from the much larger civilian nuclear facilities is neither cost-effective nor practical. According to Padmanabha K. Iyengar, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and key scientist in India’s weapons development, the Indo-US deal would reverse India’s ‘self-reliance so relentlessly built over the years against heavy odds.’8

The official Indian response to this criticism is that the access to high technology provides gains that far outweigh the costs of the separation, in addition to the strategic advantages India is likely to gain by closer cooperation with the US.9 India recently engaged in its own ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ at the IAEA meeting on 24 September 2005, when it voted with the US and EU-3 against Iran, sparking a barrage of criticism that India had abandoned its independent foreign policy.10 Should the Indians now decide to get tough on India regarding oil/gas exports, the Indians would almost certainly expect the US to assist them make up the difference.

Where to place the emphasis: strategy or nonproliferation

Supporters of the nuclear exception in the US and India usually emphasize the strategic benefits, arguing that these benefits far outweigh the risks of non-proliferation.11 The opponents in the US12 emphasize non-proliferation, arguing either that the proponents exaggerate the strategic benefits or that the costs to non-proliferation outweigh any presumed strategic gains.13 US critics, for example, argue that India is not likely to support the US on strategic issues such as managing the emergence of a powerful China and US military action in Iraq.14 However the American criticism regarding strategic issues misses the point. A strengthened India in itself serves US interests in an Asian balance of power, with or without a formal military relationship, and with or without specific support for a particular American policy line. A cooperative strategic relationship with a rising India is certainly in US interests, especially given the importance of its stability, size, economic and military strengths, and location noted earlier.

The most common American criticism addressing non-proliferation problems is that the proposal to exempt India would make a hollow shell of such international regimes as the NSG.15 The timing, they point out, could not be worse because existing international non-proliferation regimes and regulations are already strained. The most recent five-year review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, for example, was a complete failure: every strengthening measure was blocked. Other countries, it is argued, will demand similar exceptional treatment similar to that of India and the collective membership of the international non-proliferation regimes will find it difficult to resist such demands, especially if backed by a major power (such as the US for instance).16 The Treaty is clearly incomplete without the adherence of India, Pakistan, and Israel, three countries that possess nuclear weapons and are not members of the Treaty.

A US ‘realist’ response to such criticism is that each case is different India and Iran, for example, are different India has a good record at protecting its nuclear weapons technology, has no strategic reason to proliferate, and does not support terrorist activity.17 Yet potential suppliers are likely to reach similar self-interested judgements to justify still another exception.

Conclusion

The larger goals of nuclear proliferation will not work in the long run unless the five ‘legitimate’ nuclear weapons powers observe their half of the original non-proliferation bargain; they need to work intently to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. At the very least, they need to negotiate much deeper cuts in their nuclear stockpiles. Moreover, they need to ratify a test ban treaty, establish legally binding negative security guarantees, and support a fissile fuel cut-off treaty.

This brings us to the key question: does making an exception of India weaken the larger nuclear non-proliferation efforts? The answer at this point is that we probably have no way of knowing. It is important what happens next. If the non-proliferation steps mentioned continued on p. 19
Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies

By Marie Söderberg

The recent election in Japan, was a grand victory for Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who after having kicked out opponents in his own party, now stand stronger than ever. His Liberal Democratic Party gained a majority of its own in the Lower House and although the election campaign was confined to the privatization of the postal service, sweeping changes will be undertaken in the security field as there is no longer strong opposition to such changes. 'The New National Defense Program Guidelines for 2005 and After', as well as the ‘Midterm Defense Program Fiscal Year 2005–2009’ both talk about a thorough restructuring of the Self Defense Forces to make them able to respond effectively to new threats, such as terrorism and WMD, as well as providing a more proactive Japanese policy through various initiatives to improve the international security environment. Japan will now have a defense force with expanded multifunctional and flexible capabilities. There is also a definite strengthening of the Japanese–US security relationship, in which Japan is being asked to and is willing to take a bigger role. The North Korean nuclear policy is considered an imminent threat to Japan. This, in connection with the abduction issue (see below), is played up in Japanese mass media and is being used by certain groups to create changes in Japan’s defense posture. These are changes that the Japanese consider necessary to counter the larger challenge in the long term, namely the rise of China.

Historical Background and General Security Outlook

The Japanese post-war defense posture was to a large extent shaped by the Japanese defeat in the Pacific War, the strong anti-Japanese feelings among Asian countries, the US-led Allied Occupation of the country, Japan’s demilitarization, and the adoption of Article 9 in the ‘peace constitution’ of 1947, according to which Japan renounced war as a way of solving international disputes. Then Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's strategy was to rely on the US for security and only build a limited Japanese capability to defend itself. Japan thus was not forced to resolve its conflicts, or rather make up with its past and the anti-Japanese feelings in Asia.

With the collapse of the USSR in 1989, the prime rationale for the US–Japan security treaty also disappeared and the Yoshida Doctrine began to be questioned. In the wake of the first Gulf War, proponents of an alternative Japanese defense posture appeared. Some politicians believed that Japan, should cooperate with the international community and that the constitution actually allowed the nation to support UN-sanctioned war efforts. A few years later, the Japanese International Peace Cooperation Law was passed.

The present Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi supports a revision of the constitution, and a special commission is now studying this. A de facto reinterpretation of the constitution can be said to have taken place already, with the dispatch of the Self Defense Forces both to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Changes in Japan’s security policy were accelerated by the international crisis in connection with the Terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. Besides terrorism, there is another area of grave concern to Japan, in the proliferation and transfer of weapons of mass destruction, be it nuclear, biological or chemical, and the increase in the number of ballistic missiles. This fear is also closely connected to one of Japan’s closest neighbors, namely North Korea.

North Korea, China and the US–Japan Security Treaty

Although the North Koreans returned to the negotiation table of the Six Party Talks, their nuclear program is considered a threat to Japan. There is considerable anti-Japanese sentiment in North Korea as a result of the Japanese colonial period and World War II. It has also been openly stated by representatives of the North Korean government that their nuclear weapons are aimed at Japan. The North Korean ‘issue’, as it is called in Japan, is the most immediate reason for the reformulation of the Japanese defense posture.
In 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi went to Pyongyang with the promise of substantial aid packages and economic cooperation after normalization of relations. In the so-called Pyongyang Declaration, North Korea agreed to follow international nuclear agreements. Mr Koizumi also managed to secure the release of some of the Japanese citizens who had been kidnapped by the North Koreans in the 1970s. This so-called ‘abductee issue’, created an outrage in Japan where the powerful support group for the relatives of the abductees wanted detailed accounts of other Japanese citizens believed to have been kidnapped.

Soon After Mr Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, a US delegation was informed that North Korea was continuing its nuclear experiments and in this way was breaking the agreed framework, the US and its allies (including Japan) in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) retaliated by not delivering any oil to North Korea.

Together, the nuclear issue in connection with the abductee issue has made a strong stance against North Korea popular in Japan, and it is used by some groups to justify pushing for changes in the defense position. In the 21st century Chinese–Japanese trade have increased tremendously and in 2004 China surpassed the US to become Japan’s largest trading partner. Recently, the importance of the growth of the Chinese economy for the recovery of the Japanese economy has also been recognized.

The US still receives the largest share of Japanese foreign direct investments, with 45 per cent of the total. China’s share, however, is increasing and is now the largest recipient of Japanese investments in the region, receiving more investments than ASEAN. Although economic relations between Japan and China are very good, this positive feeling has yet to be transferred to the field of politics. Memories of World War II still linger and political contacts are few and chilly. In the spring of 2005 many anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred in China and an Internet campaign gathered more than 20 million signatures against a permanent Japanese entry into the UN Security Council.

To a certain extent, China’s economic development also creates new tension between the countries. The competition over the gas delivery from Siberia, as well as the rights to offshore oil and gas explorations in the East China Sea, have led to a further deterioration of the relationship. There is a considerable lack of trust from both sides.

The US presence in Japan today is substantial. Of the 100,000 US military personnel stationed in the Pacific region, more than 51,000 are based in Japan. Since 11 September, 2001, security cooperation between the US and Japan has deepened considerably and is currently advancing at a speed unthinkable only a few years ago. Japan is participating in the US program to develop a new missile defense system and Japanese–US security relations have never been as good as they are at present. According to its new Midterm Defense Program 2005-9, Japan should work to ‘further strengthen the Japan–US security arrangements’. The ongoing revision of the US military presence in Japan is also likely to lead to increased security cooperation, with a clear global dimension.

The Japanese attitudes towards any regional multilateral cooperation is that it should supplement, not supplant, the existing Japanese-US bilateral cooperation. This relationship is the most important for Japan and supersedes any other relations.

Japanese economic interests in the ASEAN countries are very strong and since the 1980s Japan has been the unrivalled partner to whom these countries have turned for trade, foreign investments and aid to build up their infrastructure. Regional integration was however considered difficult by Japan as the level of development among the countries was very uneven and the possibilities for security cooperation were very limited due to the Japanese constitution.

In the 21st century Japan is facing competition from China for the leadership role in Southeast Asia. China has wooed ASEAN with the prospect of a free trade area. This created a flurry of activity that culminated in Japan announcing that it will work towards the creation of an East Asian Community.

We are likely to see a much more active Japan in the future, not only in the field of economics but also in the field of security. When the restructuring of the Japan’s defense forces has been performed, the country will be well equipped for a larger role within the US framework for security. Japanese soldiers will not be confined to their home country any longer but will also appear in other places in Asia. Since World War II Japan has been considered a ‘political dwarf’ but it now seems to be growing out of its costume.

Note

1 Fiscal Year 2005 starts April 1 in Japan. Unofficial translations of both the above mentioned documents can be found at: http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm
A Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula: Six Parties – Zero Trust

By Nis Høyrup Christensen and Geir Helgesen

The Six-Party Talks has entered its fifth round – so far with only limited results. This article discusses the six parties and their stocks in the negotiations. It points to one major obstacle – a lack of trust – as the main hindrance for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. As a way to target this problem the article suggests a role for the EU in the ongoing process.

In April 2003 the USA met with North Korea in Beijing, with China acting as a broker for talks on the North Korean nuclear programs. The USA maintained that the issue was a multinational problem, and on Chinese initiative diplomats from all countries in the region – the two Koreas, China, Russia and Japan, plus the USA – were invited to take part in a multilateral process commencing on 27–29 August 2003: the so-called Six-Party Talks to address the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

From that point on the North Korean nuclear weapon program became a regional issue, although the two main adversaries still were North Korea and the USA. At the outset, these two antagonist each had a quite clear position regarding the nuclear issue: North Korea was ready ‘to end its nuclear ambitions in exchange for a security guarantee, energy assistance, and diplomatic recognition from the United States. But Washington has remained steadfast in its stance that North Korea must first act to verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs.’

Washington’s stance was later formulated as the irrefutable US position: ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs’, 2 which was to be seen as a precondition for real negotiations.

In the eyes of China, Russia, and South Korea the US position was inflexible and not suited to bring the North Koreans to accept the proposal. Accordingly, the first three rounds of talks did not bring the parties closer to a solution. The forth round, however, managed to produce a Joint Statement stipulating the common goal of a verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The US affirmed that it had no nuclear weapons on the Peninsula and that it had no intention of attacking North Korea. For its part, North Korea committed itself to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In exchange for this the parties agreed to discuss the provision of a light water reactor to North Korea. As such, the Joint Statement was a positive development, but the main question of coordinating the agreed steps was far from solved. At the time of writing the fifth round of Six-Party Talks was commencing.

The limited results achieved in the Six-Party Talks are little surprise. One only needs to look at the complex regional set-up with external and internal parties to be discouraged. Of the external actors with a stake in the Korean conflict the USA is the most significant, while both the US and China must be reckoned as main players with considerable impact on the process. Russia has been struggling to regain its lost position as one of the major players, apparently with some success. Japan’s geographical position makes it significant, as does the historical relations in the region. Its foreign policy may, on the other hand, be restricted by American domination, and therefore Japan may be somewhat curbed in dealing with the Korean conflict. The two internal actors, North and South Korea, obviously occupy centre stage in the conflict, but they are not free to act according to their own agenda. Remnants of the old Cold-War division, which bound North Korea to Soviet Union and China and South Korea to the US, are still in place.

The USA has already achieved something by moving the issue from a bilateral to a multilateral format. Its strategy in the talks is to attain maximal pressure on North Korea in a five against one situation with the ultimate goal of a total dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program. Given the US scepticism about North Korea’s intentions, the US will demand effective verification of any agreement. Though understandable, this is likely to produce problems in the future.

China sees the talks as a reasonable way to avoid a negative outcome of the crisis such as a major military conflict. A North Korean collapse is not in China’s interest, primarily since it
may result in the inflow of millions of refugees from the North may be seen as a primary concern. More generally it is in China’s interests to maintain a stable security situation in the North East, where a North Korean collapse would alter relations with Korea as well as Japan and the USA. China wants a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, but would possibly accept less than that as a first step. What also needs to be taken into consideration is the fact that China as the host and mediator of the Six-Party Talks has a lot of international prestige at stake.

Russia has achieved an important role as a mediator between Pyongyang and Washington. In the long term Moscow wants to re-establish its position in the Far East, and to secure its economic, political and military interests in the region. Russia has particular interest in the energy sector, since it could provide gas to the whole Far Eastern region. As in the case of China, Russia is also concerned about a possible North Korean collapse and massive inflow of refugees into the Vladivostok area.

Japan is concerned about the nuclear program, and not less concerned about the North Korean missile capabilities, and may therefore be reluctant to accept any nuclear deal that leaves the missile question unsolved. Furthermore, Japan continues to bring the abduction issue into the talks. This issue may well split the parties, however, since these concerns are Japan’s alone.

South Korea continues to emphasise diplomatic solution as the only acceptable solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. A North Korean collapse is absolutely unacceptable for Seoul, given the size and diversity of the ongoing engagement policy and also due to the huge estimated costs of a South Korean take-over in the North. Continued negotiations combined with pressure and rewards for economic reforms in the North is the only acceptable strategy for Seoul. Therefore South Korea might be the best mediator between Pyongyang and Washington.

North Korea maintains that its nuclear program (existing or not) is a necessary defensive act of deterrence due to security threats from the USA. It still claims that a security guarantee from Washington is its prime target and motivation for participating in the talks. Officials also emphasise the importance of international recognition and place normalized – that is diplomatic – relations with the USA as another top priority. Finally they demand access to international banks and financial institutions.

All parties concerned seem to be interested in keeping the negotiation process going, despite lack of tangible results. Due to an almost total lack of trust among the two main parties (the USA and for North Korea) the sequencing of any deal has hitherto been a major issue for both. Even when both parties have had acceptable offers on the table, no agreement could be found mainly because the parties failed to agree on who should move first.

A major achievement in the ongoing crisis centred on the North Korean nuclear programs would therefore be to enhance confidence on all levels. The EU, with its multicultural experience and approach, could add an important dimension to this process.

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) the US demands for North Korea to give up its nuclear program unilaterally are unrealistic, and have hitherto been a major obstacle to progress. The other powers taking part in the Six-Party Talks would probably testify to this claim. The US may need to hear from a closely related and long-time partner like Europe that North Korea’s fear of an American military attack – provoked or not – may well be a very real fear.

On a more concrete level, the EU could propose to share the economical burden of rebuilding North Korea with the US and the four other regional partners. A first step in this direction could be that the EU offered to pay for the necessary deliveries of energy supplies during a settlement process. This would be beneficial, because the existing US-funded incentive program has clear limits, due to ‘an increasingly hard-line Congress that will be sceptical of any deal with North Korea’. A natural consequence of a stronger engagement could be that the EU entered future Six-Party Talks as an equal partner promoting critical engagement with North Korea. In doing this it would prove itself as a useful, active and reliable partner not only for the US, but also – and not least – for the major and rising powers in the Far East.6

Notes
5 Ibid.
6 “This approach was part of the suggestions proposed in the latest NIAS report ‘The Security Situation in Asia: Changing Regional Security Structure?’ Report to the Danish Foreign Ministry, July 2005. It also follows the parameters of an engagement strategy outlined in the NIAS report ‘North Korea’s Economic, Political and Social Situation’. Both reports were commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Southeast Asian Security: A Short History

By Timo Kivimäki

Part of Southeast Asia's security prognosis lies in the past. The historical foundations of Southeast Asia's current role in global security are still influencing today's security situation in the region. This article looks at the historical roots of the Southeast Asian security system, and makes conclusions regarding its future challenges.

The memory of violent European colonial rule in Southeast Asia still sets conditions and constraints on European options and operations in the area. The history of colonialism has served as a powerful tool used by the regional authoritarian regimes for opposing and marginalizing European pressures for democracy and compliance with human rights norms. Europe was not sensitive about these issues during its own era in the area, so why should the Southeast Asian rulers take lessons in democracy and human rights from their former oppressors now?

To some extent, the Japanese occupation of much of Southeast Asia during the Second World War produced the same sort of 'legitimacy deficit' for Japan in Southeast Asia. According to Rapkin, this is so although this deficit has mainly had the effect of constraining the Japanese leadership in regional economic and political cooperation, and reducing Japan to following the lead of Southeast Asian institutionalization, rather than leading its own initiatives in the region.

While the US Cold War leadership has also sensitized Southeast Asia in a slightly similar manner, the legacy of US leadership has had more subtle influence that needs to be studied in detail.

During the first decades of the Cold War, the main metaphor for Southeast Asia was the theory of falling dominoes. Southeast Asia was seen as being vulnerable to 'falling' into communism, one country after another, following the 'fall' of China. Within this framework, there were two militarily strategic priority areas in Southeast Asia. The first was the 'front line' against the Communist expansion, which was in Burma, Thailand and Indochina. The second area was more directly related to the defense of the United States and was only partly in Southeast Asia. This was the off-shore island chain considered as the last resort for containment and consisted of Okinawa and the Ryukyus, Formosa (now Taiwan), the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia.

Southeast Asia's important role in the containment of China during the first decades of the Cold War, still determines some of the axioms of the Southeast Asian security equation. Overly militaristic approaches taken by the United States in its containment of Communism and revolutionism, together with the generous support by the Communist bloc of any type of anti-Americanism, pushed Indochinese nationalist revolutionism first to margins, and then into Communism. The suspicion directed towards the Chinese in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines also partly dates to this time of containment of Chinese Communism.

Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia and Burma, played a very active role in the 1950s. These nations worked against the logic of the Cold War and for solidarity among Third World and non-aligned nations. Indonesia played a leading role, with Burma's support, in shaping the Southeast Asian non-aligned movement into an anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and pro-Third World alliance. This is clear if one studies and compares the documentation of the Bandung Conference in 1955 and its preparatory meeting in Bogor six months earlier with the documentation from the Colombo Conference less than a year prior to Bandung.

The policy of working against direct alliances, the presence of foreign military bases, and the reservations that regional leaders had about the influence of the Great Powers in Southeast Asia, all survived many regime changes and became a permanent element of the Southeast Asian security approach, limiting the options for external powers to have an influence in the area. To the disappointment of the United States, even after changing from a pro-Communist anti-colonialist regime to an anti-communist regime in the mid-1960s, Indonesia still declared that it would not join the
Western alliance in its global battle against Communism. On the contrary, during his first state visit to the USA in February 1969 the new president, General Suharto, announced that foreign bases were instruments of subversion and that Indonesia’s fight against Communism would be a domestic one. The same principles of non-alignment soon became part of the region’s security identity as ASEAN declared the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).

At the end of the 1960s, the new, less self-reliant US security approach known as the Nixon Doctrine gave rise to regional cooperation and independent anti-Communist political development in the Third World. Instead of trying to do everything by itself, the United States was now prepared to give more responsibility to its friends and allies. This doctrine was the international foundation that created space for the establishment of ASEAN as a political and economic association that built the common identity of national elites on the basis of their shared anti-Communist approaches to politics. According to Liska, ASEAN represented ‘self-balancing regional autonomy’ tolerated by the hegemonic USA. For some others, the creation of ASEAN was part of a broader anti-Communist strategy indirectly authored by the United States. In any case, the change in the international setting, the move of the USA to more indirect expressions of power, and the Nixon Doctrine made the establishment of the core institutions of Southeast Asian security possible.

When the pressures of the bi-polar world began to ease in the 1980s, even before Perestroika and the dramatic decline of the Soviet world, the strategic need to collaborate with anti-Communist dictators started to decline. As a result, the forces and resources that had kept Ferdinand Marcos and the military leaders of Thailand and Indonesia in power started to vanish, and between 1986 and 1998 Southeast Asia democratized substantially. Moreover, the strategic needs to accept and encourage Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor ceased, and as a result East Timor emerged as a new state actor in 1999. The collapse of the Soviet Union also pushed the Communist countries of Southeast Asia toward economic reform, further facilitating movement towards democracy. As a result of this latest wave of democratization, three developments have taken place:

- the Southeast Asian security system, under ASEAN, has expanded and now includes all the nations of Southeast Asia.
- ASEAN has lost its common identity as a Southeast Asian force against Communism, and
- ASEAN’s original elitism has been challenged by more democratic, institutionalist ideas, and practices. These practices sometimes clash with the still powerful, original ideals of ASEAN.

ASEAN has developed to tackle the negative consequences of this transition. A new identity is being built, no longer by elitist declarations, but by genuinely developing a network of institutions, and objective interdependence. The new institutionalism has transformed the successful old ASEAN way into a successful new ASEAN way. Southeast Asia’s new institutionalized security architecture relies heavily on unofficial institutions with collaboration between academic and administrative elites. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with its newly mobilized Expert and Eminent People’s group (EEP), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) are important elements of the New ASEAN Way. These elements offer security institutions not only for Southeast Asia, but more broadly for all of East Asia. While the first decade of these organizations has mostly been very successful, some observers fear that there are a few problems that could hamper the relevance of the New ASEAN Way.

Unofficial advisory arrangements need to be proactive, planning for the challenges of the future. Furthermore, many ASEAN leaders see that these institutions need to represent the Southeast Asian authorship and ownership in regional security issues. Yet ASEAN has been reluctant to fund the new institutions: the Jakarta process (1991–2001, for the management of territorial disputes in the South China Sea) was funded by Canadians, while the first ASEAN EEP meeting, which emphasized the driving role of ASEAN in the drivers’ seat, was funded by Denmark.

Furthermore, members of the various forums often represent the ‘usual suspects’; people too eminent to be the most innovative ones in a Southeast Asia that has democratized and changed tremendously during the past decades. This arrangement risks the unofficial forums becoming representatives of the realities that existed decades ago, during the time that the eminent people were at the heights of their power.

Finally, the relevance of the unofficial institutions will be challenged, if they do not attempt to sort out the complementarity issues and the
issue of division of labour – especially since most of these organizations are represented by the same people. Once it becomes possible to copy the minutes of CSCAP meetings and use them as minutes of ASEAN EEP meetings, we must conclude that these institutions are not efficient for security promotion but are instead convened for the sake of elitist interaction – interaction that is paid for by Americans or Europeans. But we are not quite there yet.

Notes

1. This article, with the exception of the last paragraphs, relies heavily on my chapter on Southeast Asia in Kivimäki and Jorgen Delman, 2005, *The Security Situation in Asia*. Danish Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen.


4. See reports of the discussion at the Bankgkok Conference in the *Bangkok Post* 18.1.1950 and the *Nation*, 18.1.1950.

5. See draft statement by the National Security Council on 13.2.1952 (State Department 1984, *Foreign Relations of the United States. US Government Printing Office (USGPO)*; draft statement by the National Security Council on April 6, 1953 (FRUS), and memoranda of discussions on 21 December, 1954 (FRUS), and 6 October, 1954 (FRUS).

6. The final Communiqué of the Asian African Conference in Bandung emphasized the solidarity of the third world countries, and opposition to colonialism and imperialism, in a way fundamentally different from the communiqués of the conference of the non-aligned nations in Colombo. The documentation from the preparatory meeting in Bogor, available in the Gedung Merdeka, Museum of Asian African Conference, 1955, in Bandung, also illustrates this development and the Indonesian role in the steering of the movement of the non-aligned nations towards anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.


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Generations will be able to resist the temptations of using China’s economic strength to simply press through their own national interests. The challenge – for the EU too – lies in managing this strength in the future, by integrating China fully in as many multilateral contexts as possible – using and encouraging its present strong predilection for multilateralism.


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above – and already on the table – become policy, the answer is likely to be that the exception may even have strengthened the goal of nuclear non-proliferation.

Notes


4. Sumit Ganguly *India’s appetite for energy is unlikely to be curbed soon* http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/06ig.htm, September 6, 2005.

5. Brahma Chellaney *Atom-tomming lies* *The Hindu Times*, October 10, 2005.


7. Shishir Gupta and C Raja Mohan *This means a cap on our n-arsenal, says Brajesh Mishra, facts show otherwise* in *The Indian Express*, July 20, 2005.


10. ‘India’s shameful vote against Iran’ *The Hindu* editorial, September 26, 2005.


Can the EU Play a Meaningful Role in Asian Security?

Willem van der Geest, Jørgen Delman and Signe Bruun-Jensen

Are there mutual security concerns between Asia and Europe?

The interconnectedness of global security concerns was brought to the forefront of the international debate post-9/11 with the realisation that conflict and insecurity can no longer be isolated to a particular country or region. The acceleration of the process of globalisation has indeed highlighted the ways and means by which the international community tackles new challenges such as international terrorism, the spread of WMD, global pandemics etc. Whilst the extent to which Europe and Asia share common security concerns should not be overemphasised, one would be amiss to underplay the role that security cooperation between these two regions may play in the 21st century.

Europe and Asia both share the common vision of a multipolar world based on open dialogue backed by joint and strong multilateral action. Both regions have a vested interest in involving ‘Asia more in the management of international affairs, working towards a partnership of equals capable of playing a constructive and stabilising role in the world’. ¹

Many see this approach as a counterbalance to US unilateralism and an opportunity for the EU and Asia to consolidate their mutual interests and concerns.

Changing power relations and the structural consequences of economic growth at the intraregional level are also pivotal factors in addressing mutual security concerns. The much debated ‘Peaceful Rise of China’ will not only have economic consequences, but also political, societal, military etc. How Asian nations, and indeed the EU, react to China’s growing influence will greatly affect the nature of future EU-Asia relations. Alarmists’ fears that China’s irredentist policies towards Taiwan are a preview of its coming regional agenda are not entirely founded. Future security interests need not be divergent.

‘China does not pursue an expansionist agenda – the peaceful rise is not a syllogism for an unprecedented ascendance into political power, nor does it imply instability through a rise followed by a fall.’²

Asia and the EU share a common interest in facilitating China’s dialogue with the Asian region and the rest of the globe. Thus it is incumbent for the EU to address these issues through the development of a coherent policy on Asia and through the implementation of security instruments if and when problems arise.

Instruments for EU political and security cooperation with Asia

The EU has several different instruments for dealing with the aforementioned threats in the context of EU-Asian cooperation. In order to pursue its strategic objectives, it must use the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention – political, diplomatic, military, civilian, trade and development activities. The EU must also enhance its capability through establishing a defence agency and transforming its military capability into more mobile, flexible forces, and the systematic use of pooled/shared assets; stronger diplomatic capabilities and sharing of intelligence are also essential. Greater coherence is to be achieved through bringing together different instruments and capabilities. Working with partners through international cooperation and building strategic partnerships is the hallmark of such an approach.

Table 1 (pp. 22–23) summarises an array of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ instruments being developed, refined or repackage to support the implementation of the EU’s visions and strategies, indicating their strengths and weaknesses as well as their resource and institutional requirements.

The question as to whether the EU should address its security concerns through implementing ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ security measures is increasingly debated. The EU engages only in a limited way in ‘hard’ security (i.e. traditional, military) through such mechanisms as peacekeeping operations and weapons embargoes. In the sphere of ‘soft’ security, it has been much more active through economic and development cooperation as well as the use of trade policy instruments, preventive diplomacy mechanisms, membership in regional fora, human rights dialogues etc. Evidently the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ approaches are not mutually exclusive; they are key components of the
the fluid nature of international security threats, the EU should continue to work towards a clearer articulation of its interests in Asia and support this formulation with a corresponding commitment to mobilising resources. In order to do so, the EU must remain attentive to the possible roadblocks that may inhibit future progress in the security domain.

Internally, Europe must grapple with the difficult task of forging comprehensive strategies as Member States pull in different directions on critical issues. Divergent perceptions as regards the future role of the EU on the international stage, coupled with differences of threat perceptions, national interests and even the possible transfer of sovereignty to a supra-national decision making body, highlight the challenges underlying foreign policy formulation and implementation.

Externally, there is a need for strategic dialogue – at an appropriately high level – between the EU and its major allies. As witnessed by the recent tumult surrounding the EU’s declared intent to lift the China arms embargo, it can be difficult for Europe to reach clear positions on controversial issues. Unclear presentation of policy intentions, poor articulation of EU interests and lack of consultation with partners risk alienating other key players in the process. The EU sometimes creates expectations that it has not always been able to fulfil, hence the somewhat derogatory label of being a ‘talk shop’. Furthermore, if Europe is to be taken seriously in Asia, it must project a strong image vis-à-vis the region, standing firm in its convictions on security policies. With the rise of Asia as a strategic actor in global governance, it is incumbent for the EU to be engaged strategically in developing viable relations with the region. The challenge will be to implement concrete measures and mechanisms to tackle future security predicaments and to stand by decisions once taken.

Notes
1 EU Commission, Towards a New Asia Strategy, op. cit.
3 A useful analytical distinction may be made between the effects of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security instruments on the impact and the probability of conflicts. Whereas ‘hard’ security instruments and measures may, in principle, limit human casualties and economic losses, they are less suitable to reduce the probability of a conflict erupting or escalating. Indeed, an untimely or inappropriate use of ‘hard’ security force runs the risk of transforming a conflict situation into one with high impacts in terms of human casualties and economic losses.


The future of EU – Asia security cooperation

Considering the fluid nature of international security threats, the EU should continue to work towards a clearer articulation of its interests in Asia and support
### Table 1. Instruments for EU political and security cooperation with Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Resource requirement (human/financial)</th>
<th>Resource requirement (legal/institutional)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soft Security</strong></td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active preventive diplomacy</td>
<td>Experienced political counsellors at EU Delegation level</td>
<td>3rd Generation cooperation agreements with democracy and HR-clause (in place with most Asian countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Special Representatives</td>
<td>High profile representative with credibility in EU civil society</td>
<td>Legal base for operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament resolutions</td>
<td>Need for adequate information</td>
<td>Qualified majority political support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common Positions</strong></td>
<td>Need for adequate information and consensus</td>
<td>Unanimity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidency Statements</strong></td>
<td>Need for adequate information</td>
<td>No legal process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promotion of human rights (HR) Dialogue with EU</strong></td>
<td>Specialised expertise on Asian countries</td>
<td>Ratification of UN covenant on Civil and Political Rights; EU promotion of International Criminal Court ratification and membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for democracy, rule of law and civil society</strong></td>
<td>Specialised region and country knowledge</td>
<td>Bilateral agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical and financial assistance for peace processes (non-military applications)</strong></td>
<td>Asia focused budget provisions (flexible)</td>
<td>Built-in conditionality for suspension of technical and financial assistance agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership in regional security fora</strong></td>
<td>Specialised expertise on military capabilities of Asian countries</td>
<td>EU to meet membership criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other regional and inter-regional fora</strong></td>
<td>Specialised expertise on Asian countries</td>
<td>EU to meet membership criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration</strong></td>
<td>Considerable human and vast financial resources required</td>
<td>Commitment from warring factions and government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional and country strategy papers</strong></td>
<td>Specialised region and country knowledge</td>
<td>Agreement from the recipient country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic cooperation &amp; trade policy instruments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Legal base from EU Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hard Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modalities for implementation of Petersberg tasks</strong></td>
<td>Military capability under EU-approved command</td>
<td>Vast financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapons embargo</strong></td>
<td>Monitoring capabilities</td>
<td>Unanimity in the Council of EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Code of conduct</strong></td>
<td>Monitoring capabilities</td>
<td>Unanimity in the Council of EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint military exercises</strong></td>
<td>Military capability and command structure</td>
<td>EU-level agreement on command structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peacekeeping and peacemaking exercises</strong></td>
<td>Military capability and command structure</td>
<td>EU-level agreement on command structure; vast financial outlays</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In addition to contributing towards collective defence within the context of the application of Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington and Article 5 of the Treaty of Brussels as amended, the military units of the Member States of the WEU may be employed for: Humanitarian and rescue tasks; Peacekeeping tasks; Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These tasks are now expressly included in Article 17 of the EU Treaty and form an integral part of the European Security and Defence Policy.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Usage by EU for Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tacit and non-confrontational</td>
<td>Only effective in early stages of conflict (i.e conflict-prevention)</td>
<td>As instrument of conflict prevention; Asian nations reluctant to respond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political impact in countries named in the resolution</td>
<td>Largely ignored by the European public opinion</td>
<td>Frequently used in particular in the context of human rights violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send strong signals to targeted countries</td>
<td>Not legally binding</td>
<td>Myanmar, East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate impact</td>
<td>Weakness of follow-up, no legal repercussions</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High public visibility</td>
<td>Voluntary decision of participating country; denial and lack of independent monitoring; weak implementation may be interpreted as ‘double standards’ and/or lack of commitment</td>
<td>EU-China HR dialogue; Working Groups with e.g. Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted interventions aimed at strengthening institutions</td>
<td>Support initiatives may be ineffective due to hostile environment</td>
<td>EU financing ‘Partnership for Governance Reform’ in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and visibility of application</td>
<td>Possible negative impact on non-target groups; economic drawbacks for implementers; recipients’ indifference and refusal to sign agreements.</td>
<td>Sri Lanka Peace Process; support for COHA process in ACEH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public visibility and mutual acceptance</td>
<td>EU Dialogue Status only; weak implementation mechanism, absence of legally-binding policies, difficulties with non-interference principle and insistence on consensus</td>
<td>Only ARF to date (EU did not request membership in the Six-Party Talks on DPRK; EU not observer at SCO meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public visibility and mutual acceptance, venue for informal debate – usually human ‘soft’ security only</td>
<td>Weak implementation mechanism; primarily economic interests; inaction of ASEM in Indonesia, Cambodia and Myanmar</td>
<td>ASEM IV Copenhagen Cooperation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism, ASEM declarations on WMD, SCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link between relief, rehabilitation and development</td>
<td>Risk of failure of re-integration and restarting of conflict</td>
<td>Support for the demobilisation process in Cambodia, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tool for assessing potential conflict situations</td>
<td>Still weak coordination between EU and member states, irregular exchange of information</td>
<td>Inputs to formulating and implementing regional and country programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making</td>
<td>No credible military forces, nor the means to decide to use them</td>
<td>China since 1989, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political significance, ‘bargaining tool’</td>
<td>Opaqueness of international arms markets, diverging interests</td>
<td>China since 1989, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity of criteria and application</td>
<td>Ease of evasion</td>
<td>EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 8 June 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability and confidence building measure</td>
<td>May alienate non-participating allies</td>
<td>Exchange visits, e.g. UK FPDA includes Singapore and Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creates a framework for post-conflict reconstruction</td>
<td>Temporary nature, insufficient engagement may endanger post-mission stability</td>
<td>Through UN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Staff news

Maj Nygaard-Christensen held a Supra scholarship in September 2005; in January 2006 she renewed her stay at NIAS with a 6-month workplace arrangement. She has a B.A. in Ethnography and Anthropology from the University of Århus. A five-month fieldwork in Dili, Timor Leste, in 2005 resulted in a report about the role of the women’s movement in Dili in the reconstruction of Timor Leste. She is currently writing an MA thesis on the topic of nation-building, tradition, and perceptions of history in Timor Leste.

Ph.D. Candidate Nyoman Sudira, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung, is working at NIAS for four months, starting on 30 January. His thesis project is dealing with China’s rise and its strategic consequences in East Asia. Drawing on offensive realism and power transitions theory, he is analysing the geo-strategic dynamics in this region since 1991.

Recent visitors

Ph.D. Candidate Yves-Heng Lim from the University of Lyon is working at NIAS for four months, starting on 30 January. His thesis project is dealing with China’s rise and its strategic consequences in East Asia. Drawing on offensive realism and power transitions theory, he is analysing the geo-strategic dynamics in this region since 1991.

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Lifestyle and Entertainment in Yangzhou

On 19–23 October a workshop on ‘Lifestyle and Entertainment in Yangzhou’ took place in the city of Yangzhou/Jiangsu Province in China. The conference was arranged by Vibeke Børådahl (Oslo) and Lucie Olivova (Prague), who have cooperated on Yangzhou studies for more than ten years. It was sponsored by NIAS, by the Norwegian Research Council (Programme for Cultural Studies), and by the Charles University, Prague. The organization of the conference programme was further supported by the University of Yangzhou and other local cultural organisations.

The workshop took place in situ, in the old cultural town of Yangzhou itself. The sections and panel presentations took place in the very centre of Yangzhou culture: in the halls and garden pavilions of artists, merchants and literati of the last dynasty. The organizers therefore provided a forum to debate subjects concerning local cultural history at the particular locality, which added strongly to the scholarly atmosphere of the event.

The October workshop brought together a limited number of researchers of the various branches of Yangzhou studies. Participants came from universities, scholarly institutions and museums of Europe, USA, Australia, New Zealand, China and Taiwan. They were joined by local scholars from Yangzhou that had been invited in particular to deepen the understanding of Yangzhou art and local history.

Among the many topics discussed was i.e. the definition of the term modernity in the context of the outgoing 20th century. Diverging views were i.e. held on the question of the role Western influences played in the transformation of Chinese urban society from traditional to modern life patterns.

As oral literature features among the most prominent branches of Yangzhou art this section in particular was subject not only of much scholarly debate but also of lively exchange between researchers and performing artists. The organizers deserve much gratitude for having successfully brought together older and well-established performers with young upcoming talents who will hopefully carry this tradition on into the future.

Therefore apart from the contributions of the international participants those performances of Yangzhou storytellers, story singers and other artists of the performed arts were integrated part of the scholarly programme. Representing the very subjects of research to many of the participating scholars the local artists were invited as active participants and took part in the discussions. As such the participants of the workshop did not only discuss traditional ‘Lifestyle and Entertainment in Yangzhou’ in theory, but moreover had the rare chance to experience it in its present day form. This approach had already earlier been successfully attempted during the ‘International Workshop on Oral Literature in Modern China’, hosted by NIAS in 1996. This latest conference has provided perfect conditions to further develop research on Yangzhou culture. It remains only to be hoped that workshops of such intense work atmosphere shall be made a continuing tradition in the future.

This international workshop was the first activity of the ‘Yangzhou Club’, a scholarly network that also provides a website on ‘Chinese Storytelling’, http://www.shuoshu.org.

Stefan Kuzay
University of Helsinki
Institute for Asian and African Studies

Photos by Stefan Kuzay
Recent visitors

Mohammad Musfeqhus Salehin from the Center for Peace Studies, University of Tromsø, held a SUPRA Scholarship in October. He is writing an MA thesis on Governance, Democracy and Human Rights: A Study of Political Violence in Bangladesh.

Kristine Eck from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University held a SUPRA Scholarship in November. Kristine Eck is writing a Ph.D. thesis on The Escalation of Intrastate Conflict.

A delegation from the Hungarian Embassy in Copenhagen lead by the Ambassador, H.E. Mr. Öttó Róna (fourth from left), visited NIAS in October. He is here surrounded by his colleagues and some of NIAS’s researchers.

Teemu Naarajärvi, Institute for Asian and African Studies, University of Helsinki, and Jannicke Neteland Olsen, Institute of Geography, University of Bergen, both held a SUPRA Scholarship at the end of September. Teemu’s MA thesis is on China’s Ties to Central Asia; Jannicke is writing on The Chinese Processing Industry for Seafood – Adaptation to a New Competition Environment?

Anja Lahtinen from the University of Helsinki, held a SUPRA Nordic Scholarship 23 January–5 February. Anja’s Ph.D. project is on Developing China’s West: in search for modernization and enhancing cultural diversity and ethnic identity.


Sara Westman, Lund University, Center for Sustainability Studies, held an Öresund stipendium at the end of September. Sara’s MA project is on Water for the Masses? Public–Private Partnerships, Poverty and Sustainable Development – the Philippine Experience.

Emeritus Professor Frank Conlon visited NIAS in the beginning of November in order to participate in the annual general meeting of the NNC – Nordic NIAS Council. Here he gave a lecture on Knowledge Communities in Asian Studies.


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**Jie Chen** from the Department of Geography, University of Bergen, had a SUPRA Scholarship in October. His MA thesis is on *System Dynamic Approach to Guide the Balance and Sustainable Development in the Shanghai Real Estate Market*.

**Johanna Lahdenperä** from the Department of Sociology at the University of Turku held a SUPRA Scholarship for a fortnight in November–December. Her MA thesis is on *Beijing Image – Constructing a ‘Green’ Olympic City*.

**Arunas Skrudupas** from the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at the University of Vilnius held a SUPRA Scholarship at the end of November. He is writing an MA thesis on *China’s New Diplomacy: Searching for an Appropriate Strategy*.

**Legis Novianthy Noer Said** from the University of Oslo held a SUPRA Nordic Scholarship 12–23 December. Her MA thesis is on *Indonesia’s Educational Reform: Is It a Solution or Another Problem?*

**Professor Zhonghui Wang**, Acting Dean of the College of International Economic and Trade, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, China, worked at NIAS at the beginning of February. He gave a seminar presentation on *China’s New Trade Associations* at Copenhagen Business School’s Asia Research Centre (ARC). The seminar was organized jointly by NIAS and the Asia Research Centre.

**Andrei Marin** from the Department of Geography at the University of Bergen likewise held a SUPRA Scholarship in November. Andrei Marin’s Ph.D. project is on *Building Resilience and Reducing Poverty of the Pastoral Communities in the Desert-Steppe Ecosystem of Central Mongolia*.

**Antti Autio** from the Department of English, University of Oulu, held a SUPRA Scholarship 9–22 January. His Ph.D. project is on *Translation, Transposition and Rewriting: Literary Adaptation in European and Japanese Cinema and Interactive Fiction*.

**Maria Ruottu**, the University of Helsinki, also held a SUPRA Nordic Scholarship 23 January–5 February. She is writing an MA thesis on *How global is made into local: biomedicine in village context (Indonesia)*.

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**Dr. Christine Mason** from the University of Queensland in Brisbane worked at NIAS 6–23 December 2005 and again at the end of January 2006, collaborating with Gerald Jackson and Timo Kivimäki.

**Per Lundberg** from the Department of Social Anthropology, Göteborg University, held a SUPRA Scholarship 12–25 September. His Ph.D. project is on *Predicaments of Exile: Ideology, Morality and Meaning among Burmese Refugees in Thailand*.
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